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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign debt has been a focus of discussion in international law and
international relations since capital markets first opened to sovereigns in the
credit fairs of Italy. The interest paid to this topic has scarcely died down in
the intervening three centuries, and financial pages today heatedly discuss the
fate of the Argentine, Russian, or Iraqi debt. Conflicts surrounding sovereign
debt have been proffered as the explanation for wars launched, and the recent
push for developing country debt cancellation has illuminated the potentially
devastating economic effects of debt payment on states recovering from
poverty and political upheaval. Even more contentious arguments have
centered on the potential illegitimacy of debt contracted by dictatorial or
corrupt regimes. Notwithstanding this considerable discussion and conflict,
f I would like to thank Nick Frayn, Alex Gourevitch, Mitu Gulati, Devesh Kapur, Stanley
Katz, Benedict Kingsbury, Robert Post, Aziz Rana, Danya Reda, and Benjamin Straumann for their
comments on earlier drafts or portions of this Article. I would also like to thank Rawi Abdelal, lain
Johnston, Beth Simmons, and Richard Tuck for discussions relating to issues in this piece. Christina
Andersen, Jesse Brush, and the editorial team at The Yale Journal of International Law provided
excellent substantive recommendations and technical assistance in preparing this piece for publication.
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surprisingly little attention has been paid to the conceptual question at its
center: who, really, is the "sovereign" in sovereign debt?
The very practically minded may dismiss the question out of hand-
international political economy has largely assumed that this is a closed issue
in global financial practice. But, for example, there has been considerable
disagreement in political and constitutional theory, international politics, and
international law as to who really constitutes the "Democratic Republic of the
Congo." Is it the people or only the juridical state form? Translating the
question into the domestic context highlights the practical importance of the
issue. No one would lend to "DRC Inc." without a clearly thought-out account
of who in fact counts as "DRC." The entire purpose of agency theory in the
domestic arena is to make explicit the relationship between the agent who
signs the contract and the principal against whom the contract is ultimately
enforced. A theory of sovereignty should serve the same purpose at the
international level: to make explicit the relationship between the sovereign
government-the agent who signs the contract-and the principal-the
population against whom the contract is ultimately enforced., The current
sovereign lending regime finds itself in the uncomfortable situation of
functioning without a clear theory of what it means by "sovereign."
2
This practical instability has been exacerbated by the fact that
sovereignty has competing meanings in two dominant schools of
jurisprudence and international relations theory. On the one hand, we have the
narrowly statist idea of the sovereign: the sovereign is the juridical body that
has control and authority over a given people and territory. It is functionally
similar to other sovereigns in this way, and its internal structure and
legitimacy are largely irrelevant to its external relations. 3 On the other stands
I. Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, and Robert B. Thompson discuss some of the issues
involved in applying U.S. agency law (as well as other areas of domestic law) to a sovereign
government context. Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious
Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1237-45 (2007). Deborah A. DeMott discusses the applicability of common
law agency doctrines to issues of arguably illegitimate sovereign debt even more directly. Deborah A.
DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-982213.
2. The discussions of Iraqi debt after the 2003 invasion highlight this lack of clarity. U.S.
officials in particular argued that the people of Iraq never consented to or benefited from much of the
debt contracted by Saddam Hussein's regime, and thus should not be obligated to repay it. A bill to this
effect was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives. Iraqi Freedom from Debt Act, H.R. Res.
2482, 108th Cong. (2003). Of particular relevance is Section 3, entitled "Relief of the Odious Debt of
Iraq." Other states, primarily European creditors of Iraq, as well as some members of the financial
community, insisted that this more flexible approach to sovereignty has no place in the sovereign credit
market. See, e.g., Iraq's Debt, FIN. TIMES (London), June 16, 2003, at 20, available at
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentlD=7670.
3. As will be discussed below, this approach resonates with international legal positivism and
with neorealist assumptions in international relations theory. See infra text accompanying notes 45, 48.
This statist conception is also sometimes understood to be a traditional "Westphalian" approach to
international relations, which disallows intervention in the internal affairs of other states, particularly on
the basis of regime difference. But see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-
25 (1999) (noting that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia has very little to do with a "Westphalian" approach
to sovereignty, and that Westphalian sovereignty is only a subset of the capabilities that can be
associated with complete sovereignty); Darel E. Paul, Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind
Alley in International Relations, 25 REV. INT'L STUD. 217 (1999) (arguing that the "statist" Westphalian
ontology ignores the reality of overlapping political authority existing at different scales in a single
territory).
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the idea of a sovereign people, whose consent provides legitimacy to the state
and authority for its external interactions. Compounding this theoretical
ambivalence, it is very difficult to study in practice whether any particular
conception of the sovereign is at play in sovereign debt. The issue of
sovereignty is notoriously slippery and does not easily lend itself to concrete
examination. This is even more the case in international economics, which
accepts the category of "sovereign debt" as fairly unproblematic and has
remained largely free of analyses drawn from political philosophy or legal
theory.
Although this complexity raises challenges for practical empirical
analysis, it does not constitute a complete bar. This Article is premised on the
contention that the underlying conception of sovereignty in sovereign debt
issues can be operationalized through the idea of "odious debt." The legal
doctrine of odious debt, first developed after the Spanish American War of
1898 and formalized in 1927,4 argues that sovereign state debt is "odious" and
should therefore not be transferable to successor governments if (1) the debt is
incurred by a "despotic" power, and (2) it does not benefit the people. 5 The
basic concern underlying the doctrine throws into stark relief the competition
between the popular and the statist ideas of sovereignty that exist in twentieth-
century international relations. As such, the historical treatment of arguably
"odious" debt should effectively offer a window into the concept of
sovereignty that prevails at any given moment. Accepting or rejecting the idea
of odious debt in any practical instance corresponds to an inclination toward
either the popular or the statist conceptions of sovereignty, respectively. To
the extent that we view the people as sovereign agents, their payment of debt,
not authorized by them and from which they derive no benefit, is incongruous.
To the extent that we view the functional state form as sovereign, the
continuity of debt obligations makes sense so long as successive regimes
control the same territory and people. In short, the issue of odious debt acts as
4. See A.N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCItRES [THE IMPACT OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR
PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157 (1927). Sack also suggests an additional
requirement of creditor knowledge: odious debts are those "contracted and utilized for ends which, to
the knowledge of creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation." Id. at 157 ("Les dettes 'odieuses,'
contractres et utilisres A des fins lesquelles, au su des crkanciers, sont contraires aux int~rts de la
nation .... ). Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson emphasize that all three elements--despotism or lack of
consent, lack of benefit, and creditor knowledge-must be present for a debt to be deemed "odious"
under the Sackian framework. Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1218. Although Sack is frequently
presented as a preeminent early scholar of sovereign debt (as well as a Russian Tsarist Minister), Sarah
Ludington and Mitu Gulati have written a draft article that problematizes his mythic status. Sarah
Ludington & Miltu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctnne of Odious Debts
(Sept. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5. While the particular formulation may differ, the essential elements of despotism/lack of
consent and lack of benefit are consistent across various presentations of Sack's formalized doctrine of
odious debt. See. e g, PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD
WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991); Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1218; Anna Gelpern,
Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.sps.cam.ac.uk/pol-sawyer/conference/papers/gelpemodiousI 40907.pdf; Seema
Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 82 (2006); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff
King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 14-16 (Ctr. for Int'l Sustainable Dev. L.,
Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf; see also 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007) (double issue on odious debt); 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
605 (2007) (special issue on odious debt).
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an enlightening proxy for the lar er question of who counts as sovereign in
international economic relations. Perhaps more importantly, it emphasizes
that the somewhat abstract question of the appropriate conception of
sovereignty in fact has substantial distributional consequences in international
credit markets.
This Article aims to further the conversation about who constitutes the
"sovereign" in sovereign debt. It argues that the conception of sovereignty in
sovereign lending is theoretically and historically less stable than has been
assumed and contends that an intermediate or "rule of law" framework drawn
from the early twentieth century may be relevant to contemporary problems.
The Article further suggests that three sub-questions--of doctrine, policy, and
social science-must be part of any discussion on this topic and offers an
analysis from each of these three angles.
First, there is the doctrinal question of which understandings of
sovereignty are analytically available to lawyers and policymakers today. Are
we really only left with a binary choice between the statist and popular
accounts? Although the conflict between these two dominant approaches has
been at the core of theoretical and policy discussions, these polar opposites do
not exhaust the offerings of intellectual history. This Article considers an
alternative "rule of law" approach that emerged historically and is pertinent to
contemporary debates.
Second, there is the policy question of whether a purely statist approach
to sovereignty is required for a healthy sovereign credit market. Such an
approach assumes the continuity of sovereign obligations across successive
regimes and therefore mandates the payment of all debt, regardless of its
potential illegitimacy. Conventional wisdom holds that this strictly statist
conception is essential to the stability and certainty required for cross-border
lending. The discussion of Iraqi debt cancellation after the fall of Saddam
Hussein thus raised some alarm, with the Financial Times claiming that:
"Without [the principle of sovereign continuity], there would be no lending to
governments." While a requirement that creditors lend only to truly popular
governments may seriously burden the lending system, this Article contends
that an intermediate conception of sovereignty is entirely consistent with a
fully functioning sovereign credit market.
Finally, there is the social scientific question: if there is variation in the
idea of sovereignty, what accounts for this variation and its associated
6. It is important to point out that the legal doctrine of odious debt as formalized by
Alexander Sack does not constitute the entire universe of arguably illegitimate sovereign debt. In
discussing the issue of "odious debt," I refer to the broader idea of illegitimacy or odiousness rather than
to the narrower doctrine. As will be noted later in this Article, Chief Justice Taft's vision in the Tinoco
arbitration differs somewhat from that presented by Sack, although Taft is frequently cited as a
precedent for the formalized legal doctrine. For an overview of the types of debt that might be
candidates for repudiation, see Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 1208-24.
7. The Financial Times further argued that "the US should not pursue the idea of odious
debt, since the precedent is certain to come back to haunt it." Iraq's Debt, supra note 2. Maintaining the
strict statist approach discourages what the Financial Times calls "theological discussions" of whether a
sovereign state borrower is "legitimate" in any way. Raghuram Rajan, the Director of the IMF's
Research Department, went so far as to refer to the doctrine of odious debt as a "neutron bomb."
Raghuram Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous?: Why the Odious Debt Proposal is Likely to Stay in Cold
Storage, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2004, at 54.
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treatment of sovereign debt? Although much positivist international political
economy accepts the ideas of "sovereign state" and "sovereign debt" as
unproblematic, there is a growing literature in international relations theory
that highlights the contingent quality of central concepts in international
politics. Scholars as diverse as John Ruggie, Stephen Krasner, and Jens
Bartelson have pointed out the ambiguity and variable ideational structure of
sovereignty. 9 But this contingency, and the historical and theoretical variation
that it implies, only invites additional explanation. If any given conception of
sovereignty results from political and social construction, how has it been
constructed? Given the political and economic stakes at issue in the implicit
definition of "sovereign," which factors have led to the dominance of one
conception of sovereignty over others at any given historical moment? This
Article suggests that the degree of competition in the international credit
system may affect the approach to sovereignty taken in sovereign lending.
This Article aims to offer insight into all three queries of the concept of
sovereignty by returning to an open moment in early twentieth-century
jurisprudence and international relations. The post-World War I era saw the
twilight of European imperial competition and the dawn of a universalized
idea of popular sovereignty and self-determination. It also witnessed the
United States stepping more fully into the international arena, bringing with it
a pragmatic and distinctly American approach to international law. Against
this larger ideational backdrop, U.S. Chief Justice and former President
William Howard Taft issued his foundational arbitral decision in the Tinoco
Case between Great Britain and Costa Rica in 1923.10 The Tinoco decision is
generally considered the leading arbitral authority on "sovereign
recognition"--that is, the practice of recognizing the existence of a sovereign
state or government and thus granting it legal status in the international
arena. 11 This Article not only offers a reinterpretation of this key decision but
also uses the case to shed light on the three questions surrounding the
contemporary sovereign lending regime presented above.
8. This Article seeks to incorporate some of these insights from international relations theory
and may be understood as responding in part to calls for interdisciplinary legal scholarship from
Kenneth Abbott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others. See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott, Modern International
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 205 (1993) (arguing that international law and international relations "should aspire to a
common vocabulary and framework of analysis that would allow the sharing of insights and
information"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 367 (1998).
9. See, e.g., JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); KRASNER, supra note
3; John Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47
INT'L ORG. 139. See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker &
Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (highlighting through theoretical analysis and case studies how various
components of sovereignty, including territoriality, authority, and population, are socially constructed).
10. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 375-85 (1923),
available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924).
11. The case is frequently the lead citation for a discussion of sovereign recognition and, in
some shorter legal treatises, it is the only case actually discussed. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (5th ed. 1998); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-84 (7th ed. 1997); Colin Warbrick, States and Recognition
in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 238 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
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Perhaps because of its long-settled status, lawyers have tended to
emphasize only one portion of the Tinoco decision, which states that a
sovereign government exists so long as it has "effective control" and is able to
establish order over a state's population and territory. 12 This one-sided
interpretation associates Taft's foundational decision with the statist or
absolutist conception of sovereignty in legal and political theory, which
regards the internal constitutional practice of a state as irrelevant to its
sovereign status. Part II of this Article argues that this conventional
assessment overlooks a more complete interpretation of Taft's decision, which
in fact presents an intermediate or rule-of-law account of sovereignty. This
intermediate framework resonates with Taft's general jurisprudential
commitment to basic constitutionalism and escapes the binary imposed by
popular and statist schools. It also fits into a distinctly American tradition of
international law, which moved away from the absolutism of the stricter
nineteenth-century model. This Part situates Taft within a more conservative
legalist strand that emerged in the United States in the early twentieth century
and that is distinct from the liberal democratic tradition conventionally
understood to be the American approach to international law.
Part III of the Article highlights Taft's pro-market ideological
commitment and suggests that, notwithstanding the discomfort of latter-day
business concerns about the idea of odious debt, an intermediate or rule-of-
law conception of sovereignty is actually consonant with pro-market policies.
The Part points out that Taft does not require absolute knowledge of the
ultimate use of loan proceeds on behalf of creditors, which would indeed be a
prohibitive burden. Instead, the Tinoco decision suggests that creditors can
meet their burden by making reasonable effort to comply with the borrowing
country's internal rule of law and to determine that funds will be used for a
legitimate government purpose. Part III also considers how Taft's more
flexible intermediate approach promotes a stable environment for foreign
investment and may act as a stopgap to more radical and potentially disruptive
claims for popular sovereignty in international economic relations. These
arguments are made in the context of Taft's broader political commitments,
highlighting his conservative market ideology, investment-oriented foreign
policy, and commitment to judicial reform.
Looking more closely at the political and economic context of the
decision offers a first cut at the social scientific question as well. Part IV
argues that reading Tinoco in light of larger geopolitical concerns of the day
offers an initial explanatory hypothesis for variations in the concept of
sovereignty in sovereign lending and the concomitant treatment of arguably
illegitimate debt. In particular, it suggests that the degree to which creditors
are competitive will affect the narrowness or openness of the view of
sovereignty underlying sovereign debt. In times when creditors are
competitive and perceive each other as significant risks, the conception of
sovereignty is likely to be more flexible and receptive to the claims of
12. See, e g, BROWNLIE, supra note 11; MALANCZUK, supra note 11; Warbrick, supra note
11. A search for the Tinoco Case in major law journals will reveal numerous citations of the award as
support for a simplified principle of "effective control" in the recognition of sovereign governments.
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sovereign debtors. However, when creditors are noncompetitive and perceive
themselves as part of the same interest group, a more strictly statist approach
should dominate. The Part draws this tentative hypothesis from the context of
British and American political and economic rivalry in the Caribbean,
suggesting that this competition may have given Taft greater leeway in his
decision. Although a stronger explanatory claim is not tenable in the context
of a single case study, this analysis raises questions about whether the
dominance of a stricter vision of sovereignty over the course of the twentieth
century may be related to decreasing competitiveness among international
financial actors. The Article concludes with the suggestion that, in light of the
complex relationship between international frameworks of sovereignty and
local state autonomy, the intermediate or rule-of-law conception formulated
by Taft should be considered as an option for international law and foreign
policy in the twenty-first century.
II. CONSTRUCTING SOVEREIGNTY: AN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICAN APPROACH
Efforts to infuse discussions of sovereign debt with considerations of
governmental legitimacy tend to engender hostility and charges of
impossibility from some in the international financial community. For
example, Raghuram Rajan, the Director of the International Monetary Fund's
Research Department, referred to the doctrine of odious debt as a "neutron
bomb." 13 After the fall of the dictator Suharto in 1998, the Republic of
Indonesia attempted to renege on a contract for two geothermal power plants
that had been signed just prior to Suharto's demise and which, Indonesia
argued, had been signed not in the interest of the country but as a final effort
by a corrupt elite to make away with generous side payments. Upset that the
international arbitral award granted full expectation damages for the contract,
upon which the foreign claimant had not even begun performance, Indonesia
appealed to its own courts. This unusual twist was met with charges not just of
financial irresponsibility or short-sightedness, but of nothing less than
"arbitral terrorism."' 4 This alarmism fits into broader trends at the turn of the
twenty-first century, in which absolutist rhetorical positions have been
adopted by both powerful creditor representatives and third-world debt
advocates. Such alarmism only makes more pressing the need for alternative
approaches to sovereignty in sovereign debt and for fresh considerations of
what really may be feasible in international economic relations.
13. Rajan, supra note 7, at 54 In issuing a recent discussion paper entitled The Concept of
Odious Debt: Some Considerations, the World Bank refrained from such editorialization. It did,
however, clarify that the paper "does not reflect the views or positions of the World Bank's
management, Board of Executive Directors, or member states." Econ. Policy & Debt Dep't, World
Bank, The Concept of Odious Debt: Some Considerations I (Sept. 7, 2007) (unpublished discussion
paper, on file with author), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/
Resources/OdiousPaper07.pdf. The paper provides a simple summary of the main aspects of the odious
debt debate and examines how the underlying concerns of the proponents of this doctrine may more
constructively be addressed in other ways than advocating a "unilateral repudiation of debts." Id. at 24.
14. Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitral Terrorism, AM. LAW.: Focus EUR., Summer 2003,
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/aterror.html.
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This Part looks more closely at the unique framework of sovereignty and
valid sovereign action presented by Chief Justice Taft in the Tinoco Case,
placing it in the context of early twentieth-century discussions of sovereignty
and situating it within an American style of pragmatic international law. It
first argues that a proper interpretation of the Tinoco decision offers what can
be understood as an intermediate or rule-of-law conception of sovereignty that
walks the line between a strictly statist account and an account grounded in
popular legitimacy. This intermediate alternative identifies the existence of
valid sovereign action on the basis of effective control rather than consent; to
this extent, it aligns with the statist approach to sovereignty. However, the
decision insists that the mechanism for effective control, and thus the
procedure for entering into internationally enforceable sovereign contracts,
must be grounded in the internal rule of law. Under a proper interpretation of
Taft's decision, disregard by sovereign governments and their creditors for
internal legal requirements would undermine a contract's enforceability. By
contrast, such disregard for internal rules would be acceptable under the
purely statist view of sovereignty. The discussion then points out how the
Tinoco decision suggests that the validity of sovereign obligations can rest, as
an additional requirement, on the intended purpose or outcome of a contract.
A. Background and Facts of the Tinoco Arbitration
This first Section introduces the background and facts of the case very
briefly, leaving more extensive discussion of the geopolitical and economic
interests involved to Part IV of this Article. 15 Frederico Tinoco came to power
in a coup in January 1917 against Alfredo Gonzdlez Flores, for whom he had
served as Minister of Defense. Gonzdlez had been elected president by a
"loose coalition in Congress" in 1913 and had lost support in his three and
one-half years in office. 16 His popularity sank further when he responded to
trade difficulties from World War I by instituting property taxes and a
progressive income tax. 17 Tinoco stepped in to depose Gonzdiez and establish
a new cabinet, holding elections of questionable validity in April 1917." He
seems to have gained the acquiescence, if not the enthusiasm, of the
population and at least initially garnered support from domestic business
interests. 19 The United States under Woodrow Wilson, however, withheld
recognition of the new regime despite the concerted efforts of the Tinoco
government and those of the powerful American-owned United Fruit
Company and its founder, Minor Keith.2° Wilson considered the Tinoco
15. The American interests involved are discussed infra Section IV.B, in the context of
American investment, oil exploration, and geostrategic concerns in the Caribbean.
16. George W. Baker, Jr., Woodrow Wilson's Use of the Non-Recognition Policy in Costa
Rica, 22 THE AMERICAS 3, 5 (1965).
17. DANA G. MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN 1900-1921,
at 427 (1964).
18. Id. at 433.
19. Id. at 433. Although Costa Rican politics were generally far more orderly and accountable
than those of its Central American neighbors, business interests, including the coffee elite and the
United Fruit Company, held considerable sway. Id.
20. Thomas M. Leonard, Central America and the United States: Overlooked Foreign Policy
Objectives, 50 THE AMERICAS 1, 12 (1993). There is some intimation that key players in the United Fruit
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regime to be an affront to both the 1907 Central American treaty system and
his own resolve to support only constitutional governments across the
isthmus.2'
At the insistence of the United States, Great Britain also withheld
official recognition from Costa Rica, and this nonrecognition policy formed a
22core part of the 1923 arbitration. Notwithstanding their government's
decision, and thus potentially forfeiting diplomatic protection if things went
awry, several British companies took the risky step of extending their
economic involvement in Costa Rica. Of particular significance to Chief
Justice Taft's decision are two transactions. First, a British company
purchased the "Amory concession" for oil exploration. British companies had
been unable to gain a foothold in Costa Rican oil exploration despite earlier
efforts and took advantage of the opportunity presented by the new
government to gain extensive rights in the Amory concession. Second, the
Royal Bank of Canada provided a line of credit to Costa Rica, under the
control of Frederico Tinoco.
Although Wilson's nonrecognition policy was not able to forestall all
political and economic relations with Costa Rica, it did eventually help to
weaken the Tinoco regime, in part by throwing the local economy into
23disarray. The Tinoco government became increasingly repressive and
unpopular over the course of its two-year tenure. By the end of 1917, less than
one year after coming into power, Tinoco's financial policies and
militarization of the bureaucracy diminished any local support he may have
had.24 By 1919, the capital of San Jos6 had experienced considerable domestic
unrest, and a small group of counterrevolutionaries had convened at the
border. The United States and the United Kingdom continued to withhold both
recognition for Tinoco and any support for the counterrevolutionaries,
insisting on a noncoercive restoration of the constitutional government.
However, a U.S. Naval Commander's independent decision to land his forces
at the coastal city of Lim6n in June 1919 engendered suspicion of a U.S.
policy change.25 Tinoco subsequently entered into negotiations that led to his
resignation on August 12, 1919, and his government fell the following
month.26
The Costa Rican Congress's repudiation of the contracts at stake in the
1923 arbitration followed the restitution of constitutional government in the
Company had been involved in the Tinoco coup. Certainly the interests of the landed gentry, with whom
these American investors had intermarried, were initially aided by the coup, and Minor Keith himself
was related to Tinoco. Wilson perceived the American coterie in Costa Rica as displaying a lack of
patriotism and asked the Department of Justice to consider prosecuting Keith. See MUNRO, supra note
17, at 430, 439.
21. See Leonard, supra note 20, at 12. For more on Wilson's commitment to political stability
through constitutional reform, see MUNRO, supra note 17, at 271.
22. British Foreign Office telegrams indicate that the British approach to recognition during
World War I, particularly with regard to Costa Rica, was "'really that of the United States and not
[Britain's] own invention."' Richard V. Salisbury, Revolution and Recognition. A British Perspective on
Isthmian Affairs During the 1920s, 48 THE AMERICAS 331, 335 (1992) (quoting Seymour's Minute on
Graham to Foreign Office, F.O. 371/4535, PRO (July 1, 1920)).
23. Baker, supra note 16, at 11-17.
24. MUNRO, supra note 17, at 435.
25. Leonard, supra note 20, at 12.
26. Id.
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country. After the December 1919 election of Julio Acosta, friends of the
previous Gonzdlez regime sought to expunge the Tinoco contracts from Costa
Rica's debt. Although regular elections and direct voting were not established
until 1912, Costa Rica had achieved considerable political stability relative to
other Latin American countries. 27 By passing the "Law of Nullities" (No. 41)
to repudiate Tinoco's contracts, the Costa Rican Congress distanced itself
from the aberration of military rule and cleared itself of that regime's debt
obligations. However, this legislation was not uniformly supported by either
the Costa Rican government or Costa Rican society. It was driven by the
legislative branch, which reenacted the law in August 1920 to override
President Acosta's executive veto.28
The Costa Rican administration, thus bound to support the law despite
its own apparent ambivalence, was anxious for international support.
Although British, German, Spanish, American, and local interests seem to
have been affected, only Great Britain pursued international arbitration. 29 In
one of the last hurrahs of European gunboat diplomacy in the Western
hemisphere, a British minister arrived on a warship in December 1920 to
support the Amory oil concession and the Royal Bank loan. Given the threat
of a commercial boycott, President Acosta agreed to an arbitration settlement
in early 1921, but the Costa Rican Congress insisted that the British bank
claim be brought in Costa Rican courts, 30 delaying the conclusion of an
arbitration treaty until March 1923. Great Britain initially recommended the
Spanish Foreign Minister as arbitrator, 31 but Costa Rica rejected this
suggestion and counter-offered ex-Costa Rican President Jimenez. In August
of 1921, President Acosta suggested the newly appointed U.S. Chief Justice
Taft as sole arbiter,33 and an arbitration agreement was signed in early 1923.
Chief Justice Taft made his award on October 18, 1923, deciding for
Costa Rica but in a somewhat roundabout way. Both sides centered their
27. This relatively orderly approach to governmental transitions was a hallmark of Costa
Rican politics throughout the twentieth century. With the exception of the Tinoco coup, Costa Rica has
experienced regular elections with direct voting since 1912, and it constitutionally abolished the military
in 1949. See HECTOR PEREZ-BRIGNOLI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA 113, 115 (1989).
28. Telegram from Chase, U.S. Consul in Costa Rica, to Alvey A. Adee, Acting U.S. Sec'y of
State (Aug. 11, 1920), in [1920] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 838.
29. Great Britain had been especially eager to obtain oil exploration rights in Costa Rica and,
aside from the Amory concession, all other oil interests in Costa Rica were American. The United States
initially intimated that it might bring claims on behalf of the Sinclair Oil Company (the controlling
interest in the "Costa Rican Oil Company"), which had signed an agreement for subsoil rights with
Gonzilez that was then confirmed by Tinoco. Telegram from John F. Martin, Charg6 in Costa Rica, to
Alvey A. Adee, Acting U S. Sec'y of State (Dec. 13, 1920), in [1920] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 845-46.
However, the United States soon realized that Costa Rican oil riches had been overestimated. See
MUNRO, supra note 17, at 448. It does not appear that the Spanish or German claims were pursued; they
may have been overshadowed by more pressing domestic problems in post-World War I continental
Europe.
30. Telegram from Thurston, Charg6 in Costa Rica, to Charles Evan Hughes, U.S. Sec'y of
State (Aug. 12, 1921), in [1921] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 665.
31. Telegram from Thurston, Charg6 in Costa Rica, to Charles Evan Hughes, U.S. Sec'y of
State (Feb. 14, 1921), in [1921] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 646.
32. Telegram from Thurston to Hughes, supra note 30. Spanish interests had also been
repudiated in the Law of Nullities and it is possible that Costa Rica perceived Spain as having fewer
long-run interests in maintaining positive relations.
33. Telegram from Thurston, Charge in Costa Rica, to Charles Evan Hughes, U.S. Sec'y of
State (Aug. 18, 1921), in [1921] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 666.
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claims on whether the Tinoco regime constituted the government of Costa
Rica, assuming that this would determine the existence of a valid sovereign
contractual obligation. Great Britain argued that the Tinoco regime had
controlled the state's territory and population and constituted Costa Rica's
only sovereign government, and that the subsequent Acosta administration
therefore had to perform its contracts under international law. Costa Rica in
turn argued that the Tinoco regime had not been a de facto or de jure
government, and that it had, furthermore, violated the 1871 Costa Rican
Constitution. It pointed out (in an argument akin to estoppel) that Great
Britain had not even recognized the Tinoco regime as a valid sovereign
government and argued that these contracts were thus unenforceable by Great
Britain in particular. In the portion of the Tinoco Case most frequently cited in
international law textbooks, Chief Justice Taft held that the Tinoco regime
was in fact the sovereign government of Costa Rica between 1917 and 1919,
and that the British nonrecognition policy did not bar suit by British
companies. 34 Notwithstanding this classification of the Tinoco regime as a
valid sovereign government, Taft ultimately-and perhaps surprisingly-
decided in favor of Costa Rica on both substantive claims.
B. An Intermediate or Rule-of-Law Conception of Sovereignty
There has historically been a strange disconnect among international
lawyers and debt activists in their interpretation or emphasis of the Tinoco
decision. Taft's award is the lead case cited for the dominant approach to
sovereign recognition, which identifies the existence of a valid government on
the basis of its "effective control" of a state's territory and population.3 5 This
approach does not consider the potentially problematic origins or the internal
legitimacy of a state and resonates with the statist schools of political and
international relations theory. Some early readers advocated this portion of
Taft's decision as a wise choice for a stable foreign policy. 36 Contemporary
critics denigrate this portion of the award for trampling on a fuller notion of
popular sovereignty and human rights.
37
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Tinoco decision, however, is its
explicit or implicit use by opposing sides of the contemporary sovereign debt
debate. On the one hand, the case is considered a legal-theoretical support for
the idea of effective control and sovereign continuity, which means that the
34. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 381-82 (1923),
available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 153-54 (1924).
35. As noted above, it is a central case for discussions of sovereign recognition in
international legal treatises. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 200; MALANCZUK, supra note I1, at
82-84; Warbrick, supra note 11, at 238. The case is also frequently cited in practical applications of
international law. See, e.g., D.J. Devine, The Status of Rhodesia in International Law, 1974 ACTA
JURIDICA 109, 161; A.M. Greig, The Effects in Municipal Law of Austraha's New Recognition Policy,
11 Aus. Y.B. INr'L L. 33, 54, 62 (1984-1987); Amin M. Husain, Who is the Legitimate Representative of
the Palestinian People, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 207, 215 (2003); Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia
Settlement Agreements, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. I, 11 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the
International Legal Use of Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 284 (1985).
36 See, e.g., Lawrence Dennis, Revolution, Recognition and Intervention, 9 FoREIGN AFF.
204, 207-08 (1930-193 1).
37. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 870 (1990)
2008]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
same sovereign state remains and thus is subject to the same contractual
obligations, regardless of any internal governmental or constitutional changes.
This doctrine is now considered central to sovereign credit markets; without
the assurance that debts will be repaid even in cases of regime change,
creditors may be unwilling to take the risk of sovereign lending in the face of
political volatility. a3 On the other hand, Taft's finding for Costa Rica is
employed as a precedent for resurrecting the odious debt doctrine, which
explicitly asserts that the debts of an illegitimate government may fail to bind
a state after that government's downfall. 9 This latter attentiveness to internal
governmental legitimacy is frequently associated with the competing school
of popular sovereignty. While these two interpretations of Taft's decision
seem contradictory at first glance, they make sense as part of a unified
decision once we set aside the binary discourse of popular versus statist
sovereignty. What has been neglected in the Tinoco decision is how Taft
ultimately constructs an intermediate or rule-of-law conception of sovereignty
that challenges the polarized framework of debate dominant in the late
twentieth century.
1. A Statist Foundation
The Taft decision is properly taken to be a case about the recognition of
sovereign states in international law, standing for an "effective control" test as
to what constitutes a sovereign government. On the question of whether the
Tinoco regime comprised the sovereign government of Costa Rica, Taft
actually agreed with Great Britain: the Tinoco regime, at least for the majority
of its tenure, was in de facto control of the state. This assessment accorded
with the principles of international law at the time and continues to have
resonance today. 40 In his decision, Taft quoted J.B. Moore, a prominent
American jurist and member of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
on the relevant principles of law:
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule affect its
position in international law .... [T]hough the government changes, the nation remains,
with rights and obligations unimpaired .... The principle of the continuity of states has
important results. The state is bound by engagements entered into by governments that
have ceased to exist; the restored government is generally liable for the acts of the
usurper. . . . The origin and organization of government are questions generally of
internal discussion and decision. Foreign powers deal with the existing de facto
government, when sufficiently established to give reasonable assurance of its
permanence, and of the acquiescence of those who constitute the state in its ability to
maintain itself, and discharge its internal duties and its external obligations.
4 1
38. See, e.g., Iraq 's Debt, supra note 2.
39. See, eg., Khalfan et al., supra note 5, at 41-42; see also Anais Tamen, La Doctrine de la
Dette "Odieuse" ou: L'Utilisation du droit international dans les rapports de puissance [The Doctrine of
"Odious" Debt or: The Use of International Law in Power Relations] 13-14 (Dec. 11, 2003)
(unpublished master's thesis in International Politics, l'Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles), available at
http://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?article459.
40. See, e g., sources cited supra note 35.
41. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 377-78 (1923),
available at 18 AM J. INT'L L. 147, 150-51 (1924) (quoting I JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF
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Taft pointed out that, for two years, Tinoco and the legislative assembly ruled
Costa Rica without serious revolutionary activity and with the apparent
acquiescence of the people, despite the country's economic despondency.42
He discounted the importance of other states' failures to recognize the Tinoco
government, which Costa Rica presented as definitive evidence of the
regime's nongovernmental character.43 Taft concluded that although Great
Britain's nonrecognition policy might have evidentiary weight as to a
regime's status, it was not dispositive. This was particularly the case given
that the policy was "determined by inquiry, not into [the regime's] de facto
sovereignty and complete governmental control, but into its illegitimacy or
irregularity of origin. 44
This de facto control requirement aligns with the statist conception of
sovereignty in legal and constitutional theory and international law, and with
the realist (and neorealist) idea of sovereignty in international relations.45 A
government's sovereign status does not draw from any deep legitimacy, such
as the existence of a divine monarch or an ultimately sovereign people.
Rather, its sovereign character derives from the command and control of
internal affairs, and from its functional likeness on this ground to other states
in the international system. Such an understanding is akin to Jean Bodin's
definition of sovereignty as "the highest power of command" and "the
absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth. 4 6 Bodin's tradition in
political theory is carried forward by Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de
Spinoza, both of whom considered the sovereign as embodYing the supreme
political authority, free from limitations on its own actions. 7 In the preferred
metaphor of international relations theory, this account of sovereignty
conceives of the state as a "unitary black box" whose internal machinations
48
are irrelevant to its foreign interactions. Within international law, Taft's
INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906)). Chief Justice Taft cites several other authorities to the same effect.
Tinoco Case, I R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 381-82, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 154-55.
42. It is also worth pointing out that one reason for the acquiescence of the people to the
Tinoco regime, even as its popularity plummeted, may have been Wilson's own non-recognition policy.
Wilson indicated that he would not recognize a government established through a counter-revolution,
which might have dampened Costa Rican efforts to overthrow Tmoco, extending the period during
which Tinoco had effective control of the country.
43. Tinoco Case, I R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 381-82, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 154-55.
44. Id. at 381, 18 AM.J. INT'L L. at 154.
45. Both realism and neorealism are associated with the idea that, although sovereign states
vary greatly in terms of power and internal political form, they are basically like units in their ultimate
control and decision-making power. Stephen Krasner points out, however, that the ontological
assumptions of neorealism are clearer than those of traditional realism. KRASNER, supra note 3, at 45
n.1.
46. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE Six BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH I (Julian Franklin trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1583).
47. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Pub. 1994)
(1651). Spinoza similarly identified the sovereign as having "the sovereign right of imposing any
commands he pleases." BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE 207 (R.H.M. Elwes
trans., Dover 1951) (1670).
48. Such a view is presented most clearly in neorealist works of international relations theory,
which conceive of state structures and preferences as subservient to larger structural factors in
explaining international conflict. See, e.g, KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1959) (reviewing human nature, internal state structure, and international
system structure as explanations for international politics, and arguing that international system structure
provides the best explanatory framework).
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decision on recognition corresponds to the framework of sovereignty offered
by international legal positivism. Positivist international law, which rejected
the moral foundations and judgments implied by natural law approaches,
sought to organize international relations on the basis of sovereign equality
and state consent. 49 As with realist international relations theory, the internal
culture or political form of a state was immaterial to its international legal
status, and the preference or consent of the population was irrelevant to the
state's external relations.
50
To this extent, Taft's decision countered the idea of a valid sovereign
government put forward by Woodrow Wilson's nonrecognition policy, which
acknowledged only those states formed by democratic constitutional means.
Wilson's approach resonates with the school of popular sovereignty in
political and constitutional theory and international law. In this approach, the
ultimate power and autonomy associated with sovereignty does not lie in the
mere fact of governmental control. Rather, sovereignty lies with a "sovereign
people," whose consent provides legitimacy to the government and authority
for its decisions. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is perhaps the paradigmatic early
political theorist in this vein, arguing that legitimate government must be
grounded in a "social contract" in which the force of the government or prince
"is merely the public force concentrated in him. As soon as he wants to derive
from himself some absolute and independent act, the bond that links
everything together begins to come loose." 51 Immanuel Kant formulated his
preference for constitutional republics in the context of foreign affairs,
suggesting that a federation of constitutional republics constituted one
essential element for world peace. 52 Kant's insights inspired not only
policymakers such as Wilson, but also subsequent international relations
scholars, who have theorized how the domestic structure of states can affect
their external relations. 53 in international law, the strong form of a
commitment to more popular forms of sovereignty explicitly seeks to link a
state's internal respect for democratic ideals and individual rights to the
validity of its external, international actions. As such, this approach rejects
49. Perhaps the best known formulation of positivist international law is offered in LASSA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 20-22 (2d ed. 1912).
50. Id. at 19.
51. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, or the Principles of Political Right, in
THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 141, 176 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. 1987) (1762). Rousseau
continues:
[i]f it should finally happen that the prince had a private will more active than that of the
sovereign, and that he had made use of some of the public force that is available to him in
order to obey this private will, so that there would be, so to speak, two sovereigns, one de
jure and the other de facto, at that moment the social union would vanish and the body
politic would be dissolved.
Id.
52. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 3-23 (Lewis White Beck ed., Bobbs-Merril 1957)
(1795). Although Kant's insights have been taken up in what is now called "democratic peace theory,"
Kant explicitly stated a preference for constitutional republics rather than majority democracy, which he
considered a potential threat to liberty. Id. at 11-15.
53. Democratic peace theory is a subset or variant of what explanatory international relations
theory calls "liberalism," i.e., the idea that a state's international preferences and actions will vary with
its internal make-up. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 4, 513 (1997). These explanatory approaches are frequently
contrasted with Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theoretical approach. See WALTZ, supra note 48.
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international legal positivism's separation of law from moral and political
considerations. In contrast to the statist sovereignty suggested by the
"effective control" element in Tinoco, the Wilsonian tradition understands a
state's internal governing relations and political form as central to its
international legal status.
Chief Justice Taft's criticism of the Wilsonian view, if he meant it as
such, was not explicit. Taft accepted that the decision of whether or not to
recognize a foreign regime was a matter of national policy, in which different
countries and presidential administrations might follow contrary courses of
action. 55 However, he effectively mandated that the international legal
principles of sovereign recognition were separate from any national political
decision to challenge the legitimacy of another country's government. In this
assertion, Taft took a step toward insulating international relations from the
normative or value-driven preferences of particular states. Modern-day
proponents of a Wilsonian ideal of popular sovereignty criticize this finding in
Taft's decision, which may well be used as a shield by oppressive regimes
seeking to avoid international censure. Michael Reisman, among others,
expresses concern that the Tinoco decision "stands in stark contradiction to
the new constitutive, human rights-based conception of popular
sovereignty.
' 56
2. Escaping the Binary: The Rule of Law as a Facet of Effective
Control
Given the finding of a valid Tinoco government on the basis of effective
control, Chief Justice Taft's conclusion that the Amory and Royal Bank
contracts were not enforceable may appear incongruous. Although Taft agreed
with Great Britain that the Tinoco regime embodied the government of Costa
Rica, he did not therefore determine that the regime's contracts were
internationally valid. It is on the basis of this ultimate decision for Costa Rica
that contemporary proponents of the odious debt doctrine embrace Taft as a
predecessor. In deciding for Costa Rica on both the oil concession claim and
the Royal Bank claim, Taft formulates an intermediate conception of
sovereignty that escapes the binary understandings of sovereign power
presented by modern statists and democratic idealists alike.
Although Taft's decision falls far short of instantiating a commitment to
popular democracy, a closer look reveals that his effective control requirement
is not entirely statist or absolutist. Unlike a pure statist, for whom the fact of
control is sufficient to define valid sovereign action, Taft pays attention to the
54. Benedict Kingsbury points out that although Oppenheim's positivism rejects the
connection of law to morality at the international level, Oppenheim's own support for this international
legal form may have derived from political and moral considerations. Benedict Kingsbury, Legal
Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim 's
Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401, 402-03 (2002).
55. Taft specifically stated that "[t]he merits of the policy of the United States in this non-
recognition it is not for the arbitrator to discuss" and noted that he was drawing purely on international
law principles. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 381 (1923), available
at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 153 (1924).
56. Reisman, supra note 37, at 870.
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mechanism or procedure of control in his formulation. In this intermediate
framework, a sovereign government's international action is valid and binding
on successor governments only if it has followed its own internal legal
requirements for competence or ratification. Although this theoretical
structure does not mandate any particular set of internal laws, for example
liberal democratic constitutionalism, it does insist on the primacy of
respecting legal and constitutional requirements. As with the statist school,
such basic constitutionalism is not concerned with whether governmental
mechanisms are democratic or grounded in popular consent. However, this
intermediate view does conceive of a sovereign government as both
constituted and constrained by law, rather than "above the law" as presented
by either Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes.
As such, Taft's framework does not ultimately support the continuity of
sovereign obligations in all cases. If an international contract is signed in
contravention of a government's own internal laws, then that contract may
risk repudiation by a subsequent regime. Although this intermediate approach
to sovereignty and valid sovereign action does not go so far as to insist on
popular or democratic consent, it does promote both internal and external
transparency by insisting that any laws in existence are in fact followed.57 In
what would be an unwelcome development for many twentieth-century
government elites, and perhaps for their creditors, Taft effectively maintains
that even a dictatorial regime must live up to the laws on its books for its
actions and debt contracts to be internationally enforceable.
This interesting theoretical framework emerges from Taft's decision on
the Amory oil concession, which on its own makes for a fairly dry narrative.
Taft states that the validity of the concession is "to be determined by the law
in existence at the time of its granting," namely the law of Costa Rica under
the Tinoco government.58 in line with the de facto control rule of recognition,
Taft considered irrelevant the fact that the Tinoco government itself had
emerged in contravention of the previous constitution and counter to
democratic principles. He made no reference to any deeper underlying
concept of sovereignty, such as inherent popular ownership of a country's
natural resources, and delinked the validity of state action from the underlying
legitimacy of the state. Having established this formalist framework, however,
Taft's decision follows it strictly. His ultimate finding for Costa Rica on the
57. It is important to point out that this approach does not present a clear substantive vision of
the good, and that its emphasis is largely procedural. Taft's intermediate framework thus would allow
particularly brazen government elites to change internal laws to suit their purposes and then sign
contracts on the basis of these new and more accommodating laws. It may be argued that it is to a large
degree an empty standard, particularly if the standard for "good law" is drawn from human rights or
popular sovereignty. This Article does not aim to participate in legal philosophy's debate about whether
the rule of law is itself intrinsically linked to ethics or the moral good. (For more on the separation
thesis, see the work of Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, Gustav Radbruch, Robert Alexy, H.L.A. Hart,
Joseph Raz, and others.) However, it does seem that promoting transparency, consistency, predictability,
and the like at least helps to clear away the self-important obfuscation of many oppressive regimes and
better exposes the true nature of ruling elites to a state's population. It is also worth pointing out that few
government elites explicitly admit to and legalize corruption, nepotism, and collusion, perhaps in part
because of myths they have developed about their own rulership. As such, holding governments to their
own internal rule of law may well have some substantive effect.
58. Tinoco Case, 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 397, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 172.
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Amory oil concession rested on an assessment of Tinoco's own governing
laws, and in particular on the legislative approval requirements of Tinoco's
1917 Constitution.
59
The Amory concession contract had been signed by Aguilar, the
Minister of Public Works, and John M. Amory & Son, a technically American
firm that was an agent for British Controlled Oilfields, Ltd.60 As part of the
Amory-Aguilar enterprise, Costa Rica had exempted the British company
from national tax increases for fifty years, as well as from payment of local or
municipal taxes. As a result, Taft points out that the grant of this concession,
"involved the power to approve laws fixing, enforcing or changing direct or
indirect taxes." 61 This taxing power, however, was among those enumerated
by the Tinoco Constitution as belonging exclusively to the Congress sitting
jointly, and thus including both the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of
Senators. 62 Notwithstanding this requirement, the Amory concession had been
approved only by the Chamber of Deputies. Rejecting Great Britain's urging
of a modified construction of the Constitution, Taft found that "[a]s the
Chamber of Deputies was expressly excluded from exercising this power
alone, Article X" of the concession contract, which granted the tax exemption,
"was invalid. 63 Taft also refused to separate out the tax exemption clause
from the remainder of the concession, considering the fifty-year exemption,
"one of the great factors of value in the contract." 64 In refusing to limit or
rewrite the contract, Taft invalidated the Amory concession as a whole.65
Abstracting from the particular facts and rule of the case, the Tinoco
decision on the Amory concession makes a critical theoretical move. As stated
above, the foundation of Taft's approach to international law initially seems
very statist: a sovereign state government exists when it has de facto control
of a country. Considerations of legitimacy drawn from a strong understanding
of individual rights, democratic consent, or other value-orientations are set
aside. Taft takes a similarly formalist view of the relevant law for a sovereign
state contract as being the law in force at the time of the contract; again,
normative concerns are irrelevant. However, the Amory concession decision
sets a limit on the de facto sovereign government's power, forcing any regime,
whether dictatorial or democratic, to abide by its own laws in entering
59. Id. at 398-99, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 173-74.
60. Id. at 396, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 169. Taft quickly acknowledged that the British assignees
of the concession had acted properly under the contract and dismissed Costa Rica's argument that Great
Britain could not bring a claim on behalf of a company incorporated in the United States. Id at 396-97,
18 AM.J. INT'L L. at 171-72.
61. Id. at 398, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 173.
62. According to the facts of the case, the taxing power was one of the ten exclusive
congressional powers enumerated under Article 76 of the 1917 Costa Rica Constitution. Id at 397, 18
AM. J. INT'L L. at 172.
63. Id. at 398, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 173. Taft did not consider five other instances in which the
Chamber of Deputies alone granted tax exemptions as modifying the practical construction of the
Tinoco Constitution, given that these minor incidents did not amount to an amendment of the
fundamental law. Taft additionally referenced a situation in which Frederico Tinoco himself vetoed a
law granting future tax exemptions on the grounds that only Congress as a single body could grant such
an exemption. Id. at 393, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 173.
64. Id. at 398, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 173; see also id. at 398, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 174 (stating
that the exemption was "too vital an element in its value" to be excluded from the contract).
65. Id at 399, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 174.
2008]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33: 63
internationally enforceable sovereign contracts. In this, Taft steps away from
understanding law in the stark terms offered by John Austin, as merely "the
command of the sovereign backed by force." 66 In its place, Taft formulates a
vision of effective control that privileges law over both force and democratic
ideals, navigating an intermediate position between the popular and the
strictly statist forms of sovereignty.
It is important to point out that the Amory concession decision rested
upon a central constitutional principle: the apportionment of powers among
branches of government. It is less certain how Taft would have decided on the
oil concession if a lesser legal rule had been implicated. Certainly, the
important constitutional principles touched upon by the grant of the
concession seem to have carried weight in the decision. Taft felt that the
Amory contract was so defective that "the government of Tinoco itself could
have defeated this concession on the ground of a lack of power in the
Chamber of Deputies to approve it. '6 7 At the very least, the Tinoco decision
represents more than just the recognition of sovereignty on the basis of a
minimal requirement of "effective control." It stands as well for the
proposition that a sovereign contract may not be enforceable under
international law if the procedural execution of the contract contravenes a
significant element in that sovereign government's own internal laws.
Although the Tinoco decision focuses on the apportionment of governmental
powers as the central legal element invalidating the Amory concession, other
important legal or constitutional principles might implicate federalism,
minority or local autonomy, and injunctions against high-level corruption,
among others.
This conception of sovereignty and valid sovereign action as constituted
and constrained by the internal rule of law does have some corollary in
political and legal theory. Published only four years before the Tinoco
decision, Max Weber's seminal Politics as a Vocation modified the definition
of statehood from one grounded in control or force alone to one that involved
the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory." 6 Although the "physical force" element is frequently emphasized,
one of Weber's key contributions was to add the additional element of
legitimacy. Similar to the Tinoco decision, and unlike democratic or liberal
theorists, Weber himself did not insist on any substantive internal
requirements for this ultimate legitimacy and considered that different types of
domestic regimes would be consonant with legitimate statehood.69 Perhaps an
66. This is a common shorthand for Austin's conception of the law; another frequently used
formulation is "the command of the sovereign backed by a sanction." In laying out the essential
elements of "law properly so called," Austin highlights three key features: (I) a command from a
determinate body, (2) a sanction or "eventual evil annexed to a command," and (3) the source of the
command from a political superior. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 101-
02 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., Dartmouth 1998) (1863). Austin also makes clear that "the
sovereign power is incapable of legal limitation.., without exception." id. at 183.
67. Tinoco Case, I R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 399, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 174.
68. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
69. He viewed traditional patrimonialism, charismatic authonty, and more modem forms of
"legality" as equally possible legitimations or inner justifications for state domination. Id. at 78-79.
Although Weber identified legality as only one among different potential sources of legitimacy, he
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even more paradigmatic thinker in this approach is the legal theorist Hans
Kelsen, an early progenitor of legal positivism. 70 Kelsen considered the
identification of legally valid sovereign action as possible only within the
context of a state's internal norms or legal rules, which in turn build from the
basic norm (grundnorm) or constitution of that polity.7' He did not, however,
insist on any substantive content (such as democratic or liberal ideals) for
those internal rules to constitute valid legal action.
While this basic constitutionalist tradition has not been well represented
in contemporary debates in political theory and international relations, the
resulting theoretical gap may be due in part to the historical misinterpretation,
or rather underinterpretation, of Taft's award in the Tinoco Case. Although
Taft's decision is considered foundational in international legal practice, a
narrow focus on his finding of sovereign recognition on the basis of effective
control neglects what makes the case especially distinctive. In particular, it
ignores the fact that the Tinoco decision presents a coherent framework for
understanding internationally valid sovereign action on the basis of a state's
internal rule of law. This domestic or internal legalism then becomes the
relevant procedure for controlling and committing a state's resources at the
external international level. Thus, while the decision does not mandate any
substantive rules for domestic law-and Taft himself was wary of claims of
substantive justice-it insists that basic internal laws must actually be
respected. Both the decision's commitment to basic constitutionalism and its
technical and formalistic aspects accord with Taft's jurisprudence more
generally. As will be noted in Part III of this Article, Taft viewed law as the
principal defense against disorderly government and unruly populism, and in
particular, considered the separation of powers (preferably with a strong and
paramount judiciary) essential to maintaining political order. Although Taft's
conception of a sovereign government is not linked to a deep idea of popular
legitimacy, the sovereign is not absolute in the sense of being able to break its
own laws and is, at least to some degree, defined by its law. In other words, a
close reading of Taft's resolution of the Tinoco claims lays the ground for a
valuable intermediate approach to the concept of the "sovereign" in sovereign
debt issues and in international relations more generally.
3. Governmental Purpose as a Requirement for Valid Sovereign
Action
Although the discussion of the Tinoco Case so far has focused on its
presentation of a rule-of-law framework for valid sovereign action, the
decision also suggests an outcome orientation as an element of legitimate
government contracts. In particular, Taft's finding on the Royal Bank's
monetary debt claim indicates that a sovereign debt contract may not be
considered that increased rationalization of the government and economy-in part through a
strengthened rule of law-would be a (potentially problematic) corollary of modernity.
70. Later thinkers associated with positivism in legal philosophy, such as H.L.A. Hart and
Joseph Raz, departed from Kelsen's stricter vision.
71. This basic norm itself "cannot be derived from a higher norm," but instead "constitutes the
unity in the multitude of norms by representing the reason for the validity of all norms that belong to this
order." HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 195 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960).
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internationally enforceable unless it intends to serve a legitimate
governmental purpose. This separate and additional requirement would be
equally applicable to all regimes, regardless of their internal rule of law or
whether that internal law had actually been obeyed. Thus, a sovereign contract
not intended to serve the underlying state might be invalid, even if it followed
the relevant internal legal procedures.
72
The facts of the Royal Bank claim make clear that the legitimate
governmental purpose requirement cannot exist only on paper. The Royal
Bank of Canada, the second claimant in Great Britain's suit against Costa
Rica, had furnished US$200,000 7 in funds to Frederico Tinoco in the
regime's last days, ostensibly to fund the "representation of the Chief of State
in his approaching trip abroad" as well as for four years of advance
remuneration to Tinoco's brother as the ambassador to Italy. 74 Taft used a
contextual approach to determine that these funds were not actually grounded
in valid governmental objectives, and thus were not the debt obligations of
Costa Rica after the fall of the Tinoco regime. In the quote most used by
proponents of the odious debt doctrine, Taft found against Great Britain and
the Bank because "all the circumstances should have advised the Royal Bank
that this tloan] was for personal and not for legitimate government
purposes." 5 The relevant circumstances for determining the private as
opposed to the public nature of the credit included a transaction full of
irregularity and informality, and a lack of underlying legal authority for the
initial credit fund. Filling out this narrative, Taft highlighted the "most
unusual and absurd course of business" involved in paying salaries four years
in advance, and pointed out that the bank knew that this money was to be used
by the Tinoco brothers for their personal use. Taft denied that either the Royal
Bank or Frederico Tinoco "could hold [the Costa Rican] government
responsible for the money paid.., for this purpose."76 As further evidence of
the private rather than the public nature of the funds, Taft pointed to the fact
that the popularity of the Tinoco regime had disappeared by the spring of
1919 and that the movement to end that regime continued gaining strength
until Tinoco's resignation.
77
It may be argued that the Tinoco regime was not actually in effective
control of the country when the Royal Bank notes were drawn, and that Chief
72. This means that in Taft's framework, a contract can be invalidated on one of two grounds:
either as a violation of the internal rule of law or as inconsistent with legitimate government purpose
(both prongs would be contingent on creditor knowledge, as discussed later in this Section). This differs
somewhat from Alexander Sack's formalized doctrine of odious debt, in which a government contract
must meet all three prongs (despotism/lack of consent, nonbeneficial purpose, and creditor knowledge)
before being considered odious. SACK, supra note 4. A range of frameworks for understanding the
validity of sovereign debt can be imagined by combining different conceptions of sovereignty (statist,
rule of law, or popular) with varying requirements for governmental purpose.
73. This is about $2,272,700 in 2006 dollars, calculated using a CPI Conversion Factor of
0.088. For CPI conversion factors for years 1665 to estimated 2017, see Robert Sahr, Inflation
Conversion Factors for Dollars 1665 to Estimated 2017, http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty-
research/sahr/sahr.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
74. Tmoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 394 (1923), available
at 18 AM. J. INT'L L., 147, 168 (1924).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 393, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 167.
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Justice Taft's award on this portion of the case follows necessarily from his
threshold test for recognizing a sovereign government. The "legitimate use"
arguments would then be secondary, as the very existence of a sovereign
government legally competent to enter into international contracts would
disappear along with the control itself. However, Taft does not regard the
political disorder and lack of control as dispositive on the Royal Bank claim,
instead presenting them as part of the evidence that the loan was unlikely to
serve valid state interests. After enumerating the sinking popularity of the
Tinoco regime among other factors, Taft holds that, "all the circumstances
should have advised the Royal Bank that this ... was for personal and not for
legitimate government purposes. 7 8 The existence of a legitimate government
purpose appears to be the deciding point, with the extreme circumstances
acting as supporting evidence.
Taft also offers a suggestion as to the burden of proof on the issue of a
creditor's knowledge regarding a loan's ultimate purpose. The remedy of debt
repudiation may not be available under Taft's framework unless the lender
knew about the illegitimate nature of the debt contract itself, i.e., that the end
uses were not designed to serve the interests of the underlying public. Thus, if
a lender makes a loan in good faith, it should be able to collect on that loan
despite its ultimate ill use. However, Taft seems to allow for the possibility of
constructive knowledge, or the idea that a creditor may be held to the level of
knowledge obtainable through ordinary care and diligence. This idea that a
party "knew or should have known" relevant facts or conditions has been used
in domestic contract law to prevent willful ignorance and a failure of due
diligence. 79 Moving to the level of international sovereign contracts, this may
put the burden of proving good faith on the creditor claimant rather the
sovereign debtor. With regard to the Royal Bank claim, Taft states "[the
Bank] must make out its case of actual furnishing of money to the government
for its legitimate use. ' 8° He even suggests that evidence of knowledge can
derive from the circumstances of the loan, in stating that, "all the
circumstances should have advised the Royal Bank" of the illegitimate end
use of the loan at issue.
8 1
Although theories of sovereignty generally focus on the procedural
element in the relationship between ruler and ruled, 82 Taft's attention to
78. Id. at 394, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 168.
79. Considerable case law has developed to explain the standard of care and investigation
involved in meeting this requirement. For an extensive discussion of how requirements vary across
different types of business transaction, see GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS (1994).
80. Tinoco Case, I R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 399, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 174.
81. Id. at 394, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 168.
82. There are exceptions to this general tendency. For example, both David Hume (a
monarchist) and Joseph Emmanuel Siey~s (a democrat) focused on how sovereign debt or "public
credit" might undermine the basic responsiveness of the government to the underlying needs of the state.
For a discussion of Hume, see Istvan Hont, The Rhapsody of Public Debt: David Hume and Voluntary
State Bankruptcy, in JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 325 (2005). Sieys expresses a similar concern that sovereign debt will
undermine this responsiveness in the context of the French Revolution. Emmanuel Joseph Siey~s,
Further Developments on the Subject of a Bankruptcy, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 60 (Michael Sonenscher
ed., 2003). For a more extensive theoretical discussion of the relationship of sovereignty to agency, and
of the procedural and outcome-orientation aspects of sovereignty in sovereign obligation, see Odette
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legitimate purpose has a corollary in domestic business transactions. Although
the officers and directors of a company or corporation may have considerable
leeway in making decisions on the company's behalf, these decisions must at
least ostensibly be in the best interests of the company itself. This constitutes
the core of the "business judgment rule," which provides a bar against the use
of corporate contracts to serve illegitimate or poorly considered ends.8 3 Taft's
presentation of a legitimate purpose requirement effectively constitutes what
might be understood as a parallel "government judgment rule." Sovereign
governments have considerable leeway to make decisions on behalf of the
state, so long as they work within their own internal legal frameworks.
However, regardless of the government's constitutional form, these decisions
must serve a goal related to the underlying state. This basic attention to
legitimate purpose can act as a partial obstacle to the use of international
"sovereign" debt as a source for the private enrichment of a regime's ruling
elite. In a sense, Taft's discussion of legitimate intention incorporates an
element of mainstream corporate law into requirements for international
sovereign contracts.
Attending to both the rule of law and the governmental purpose aspects
of the Tinoco Case reconciles the decision's use as a precedent for both the
doctrine of sovereign continuity and the doctrine of odious debt. On the one
hand, Taft's decision identifies the existence of a valid government on the
basis of its effective control rather than its popular legitimacy and thus allows
for the continuity of sovereign obligations across different regimes controlling
the same people and territory. However, he insists that the mechanism for
controlling and committing state resources in an international contract must lie
in the internal rule of law, thereby rejecting a purely absolutist or statist
approach to sovereignty. The Tinoco decision also suggests a legitimate
purpose requirement for internationally enforceable sovereign debt contracts.
In so doing, Taft provides two avenues for the repudiation of arguably
illegitimate or odious debt: either through an internal legal failure or due to a
failure to meet the requirement of a valid governmental purpose.
As noted above, legal scholars have similarly highlighted two main
elements in the formalized doctrine of odious debt, both of which must be
present for the definition to hold. Sovereign state debt is odious and should
not be transferable to successor states if the debt was incurred (1) by a
despotic regime or without the consent of the people and (2) not for their
benefit.84 As in Tinoco, creditor knowledge is relevant to assessing creditor
Lienau, The Missing Agency Question: Competing Frameworks of Sovereignty in Sovereign
Contracting (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
83. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (offering clear
application of the business judgment rule). See also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business
Judgment Rule, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 573 (discussing explanations for the business judgment rule and how
it relates to the legal duty of care).
84. See SACK, supra note 4, at 157; see also sources cited supra note 5. Sack emphasizes the
importance of beneficial public purpose as follows:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to
strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it ... (t]his
debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime's debt, a personal debt of the power
that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power.
ADAMS, supra note 5, at 165 (quoting SACK, supra note 4, at 157).
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wrongdoing on both of these elements.85 Even without a strict commitment to
democratic or popular sovereignty, both the odious debt doctrine and Taft's
formulation maintain some link between the government and the underlying
state and people. Unlike Taft's formulation, however, both prongs of Sack's
formalized doctrine must be satisfied before a debt may be declared "odious"
and subject to repudiation; if either the debt was incurred for public benefit, or
it was contracted with popular consent, then the debt would not be odious
under Sack's definition. 6 The Tinoco decision severs these elements,
allowing invalidation on either of these two prongs. Whereas Taft's Amory
concession decision clearly finds that even an "illegitimate" or nondemocratic
government may enter into enforceable contracts by following its own internal
laws, the Royal Bank portion of the case suggests that any government must at
least intend to benefit the underlying sovereign state in its international
actions.8
7
What becomes clear in this closer reading of Taft's Tinoco decision is
that a binary framework of popular versus statist sovereignty does not exhaust
the offerings of twentieth-century political and legal thought as applied to
international economic issues. Imposing this polarized discourse on sovereign
debt issues and international relations more generally limits the scope of
discussion and the range of possible solutions to complex problems of
international economic practice. It also, potentially, hinders a more complete
interpretation of Taft's foundational decision on the practice of sovereign
recognition. The discussion here has presented Taft's Tinoco ruling as
ultimately constructing an intermediate or rule-of-law conception of
sovereignty that escapes the binary imposed by the two dominant approaches.
This conception, which has some precedent in political and legal theory,
conceives of sovereignty and valid sovereign action through basic
constitutionalism and the internal rule of law. The Tinoco decision combines
this rule-of-law framework with a requirement for legitimate government
purpose to determine the validity of international sovereign action. As will be
discussed in Part III of the Article, this intermediate account may well be
appropriate for a functioning sovereign credit market, despite the objections of
some in the contemporary financial community.
C. Situating Taft's Approach in the Legal Tradition
Taft's decision in the Tinoco Case does not lend itself to easy
classification within a tradition of American or international legal thought.
However, the decision marks a unique strain in approaches to international
law that may still be identified as part of the American tradition. Analyses of
American approaches to foreign policy and international law frequently
highlight the utopian or missionary element in U.S. history. Generally, this
85. See SACK, supra note 4, at 157; see also sources cited supra note 4.
86. See SACK, supra note 4, at 157.
87. The severability of the "rule of law" and the legitimate government purpose elements in a
strict reading of Taft's framework is apparent in the finding on the Amory concession. The exploration
and development of potential oil fields is presumably a legitimate government purpose. Notwithstanding
this public purpose, Taft voided the contract on the basis of inconsistency with key elements of internal
constitutional rule alone.
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utopian impulse is associated with a commitment to the promotion of liberal
democratic constitutionalism. 88 However, Taft is part of a tradition that
maintained the utopian element but distinguished it from an insistence on
popular self-determination, transcribing it instead onto a narrower dedication
to the rule of law. In Taft's vision, the commitment to proper procedure and
the rule of law itself becomes a central substantive feature of international
law.
Taft's domestic legal practice is associated with the tradition of legal
classicism or legal formalism, which embodied a type of reasoning that has
been characterized as relatively abstract, formal, and conceptualistic. 89 Such
legal orthodoxy, popular during the nineteenth century, imagined law as an
autonomous sphere in which neutral legal principles could be applied
objectively to situations of fact.90 The social values of this approach generally
included an exaltation of individual will and a related hostility to state
intervention and were manifested economically in a laissez-faire commitment
to free markets, particularly in labor.91 Its conception of individual rights drew
from the tradition of liberalism formulated by John Locke and John Stuart
Mill, a tradition which privileged rights of contract and property. As will be
discussed in the following Part, Taft himself espoused these general values,
and his tenure as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court can be considered an
instantiation of legal classicism or legal orthodoxy in American
jurisprudence. 92
This form of legal classicism is usually contrasted with the school of
pragmatism that gained popularity in the early twentieth century. Generally
speaking, legal pragmatism engendered a commitment to understanding law
not as existing within its own abstract, formal, and separate sphere, but rather
as grounded in a commitment to human well-being against the background of
particular sociopolitical and economic contexts. 93 Perhaps its most distinctive
claim, famously formulated in Roscoe Pound's early writings, is that law
should be rooted in a sense of social purpose, that mere formalistic "legal
justice" should give way to "social justice," and that the "mechanical
88. See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative
Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 551, 554-67 (2003) (identifying liberal constitutionalism as
a "utopian world vision" that makes coherent initially contradictory strains in the American approach to
international law).
89. For a brief introduction to the basic philosophical tenets of classical legalism, see, for
example, WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY
IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 4-7 (1998). For a review of the structure of classical legal thought in the
context of American jurisprudence between 1870 and 1905, see MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 9-32 (1992). Wiecek identifies the Taft Court as a
return to the basic foundations of classicism in Supreme Court jurisprudence. WIECEK, supra, at 162-64.
90. WIECEK, supra note 89, at 5-7.
91. See id. at 7-10.
92. The Taft Court can be understood as a return to the basic tenets of classical legal thought
popular in the nineteenth century (notwithstanding the powerful dissents written by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis), although Taft himself did not quite adhere to strict Lochner doctrine. Id. at 162. This period
continued past Taft's resignation and death until the challenges presented by executive and legislative
responses to the Great Depression. See id. at 164.
93. Philosophical pragmatism was formulated by William James and John Dewey, among
others. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING
(1907). For a discussion of the incorporation of pragmatism into legal theory at the time, see MORTON G.
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 59-75 (1949).
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jurisprudence" of the classical model must make way for a new results-
oriented "sociological jurisprudence." 94 Pound extended his analysis to the
international sphere and argued for a "critique of international law in terms of
social ends." Following World War I, this approach was adopted more
broadly in what might loosely be called a pragmatic "American" international
law. 96 This American account challenged the nineteenth century's statist
conception of international law, which posited a largely unfettered sovereign
government limited only by its own consent, and which came under attack
after the disorder and violence of World War I. In its place, jurists and
politicians sought to constrain the "black box" approach of strictly statist
sovereignty 97 by constructing international institutions such as the League of
Nations and also by paying greater attention to the internal characteristics of
sovereign states. 98 Drawing from the larger American impetus toward regime
reform, this project involved linking substantive requirements for internal
governmental sovereignty to the acceptance of sovereign states externally into
the "family of nations."
99
At first glance, this approach seems more akin to Woodrow Wilson's
policies and quite antithetical to Taft's more conservative domestic
jurisprudence and his suspicion of using law for progressive social purposes.
It makes more sense, however, if we distinguish between two schools of
American "missionary" thought in international law, separating out a
commitment to basic constitutionalism and rule of law from the promotion of
liberal democracies.100 Reflecting on the American world court movement in
the first decades of the twentieth century, David Patterson argues that
"students of diplomatic history should talk with caution about the moral-legal
tradition in American foreign relations. As applied to American
internationalists, the hyphen between the two words should indicate not only a
complementary relationship but a tension as well. ''1°1 As is evident from Chief
94. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908); Roscoe
Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
95. Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, I BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA
DISSERTATIONUM IUS INTERNATIONALE ILLUSTRANTIUM 72, 89 (1923).
96. See Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions, 34 N.Y.U. J
INT'L L. & POL. 513, 521-22 (2002).
97. Although the metaphor of a state as a "black box" (or sometimes a "billiard ball") is
drawn from the neorealist school of international relations theory, it is equally applicable for statist
approaches in international law. Both paradigms consider the state to be opaque for analytical purposes.
Although different states have different internal political regimes, economic structures, and cultural
preferences, realism (and neorealism) and international legal positivism each minimize the importance
of these variations. They consider such internal differences irrelevant for understanding states' external
relations (variants of realism) or for assessing a state's legitimacy under international law (international
legal positivism). See also discussion supra notes 45-48.
98. Cohen highlights the creation of international legal distinctions between legitimate and
illegitimate sovereign states as a feature that illuminates American approaches to international law more
generally. Cohen, supra note 88, at 569.
99. Anghie, supra note 96, at 535-38. Anghie argues that Western nations embarked on a
project of defining and constructing sovereignty for mandate nations, with ramifications far beyond this
narrower group of states.
100. This liberal democratic strain is that most commonly associated with "idealist" American
foreign policy. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 88, at 555-67.
101. David S. Patterson, The United States and the Origins of the World Court, 91 POL. SCI. Q.
294 (1976). In fact, Taft did join with American pragmatists in his international commitments,
particularly to establish the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League of Nations.
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Justice Taft's decision in Tinoco, incorporating the requirements of the rule of
law and the public good into a conception of "sovereign" in international law
does not necessarily take the next step of instituting liberal democratic
constitutionalism as a final goal. Taft was explicitly involved in the promotion
of the international rule of law, not as a means for entrenching a substantive
vision of global justice, but rather as a mechanism for maintaining order and
discipline. 1°2 In this context, Taft campaigned for both the League of Nations
and the World Court several years before Woodrow Wilson became
associated with the League. 03 In a similar vein, Taft pressed for a
comprehensive international arbitration treaty in Congress, which would make
justiciable any international controversy among "civilized nations."' 0 4
In short, Taft's Tinoco decision is of a piece with the larger project of
American international law, but it instantiates a more conservative and
legalistic doctrine than that imagined by conventional understandings of
American foreign policy. Although the missionary zeal remains, it does not lie
in policing foreign governments for their liberal democratic principles or
human rights compliance. Rather, it encourages their commitment to a more
procedural utopian vision of rule by law, which, in Tinoco, is married to a
basic requirement for legitimate government purpose. In short, Taft's vision
corresponds to a tradition of basic international legalism in which the primary
purpose of international law is not the promotion of liberal democracies or
human rights, but rather the encouragement of the rule of law as such. The
Tinoco decision takes a step in this direction by incorporating a domestic rule-
However, as Patterson discusses in his essay, the general outlook and background philosophical
commitments of the international legalists and the broader international pragmatists should not be
confused. For an alternative formulation of the "legalist" approach to U.S. foreign policy on
international law and organizations, see FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER:
THE LEGALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1898-1922 (1999). Boyle also insists on the
difference between a legalist and a utopian-moralist approach to international law. Id. at 8.
102. Taft's concern at the international level extended beyond particularistic diplomacy to "a
mechanism to preserve world order." DAVID H. BURTON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CONFIDENT
PEACEMAKER 115 (2004). Even during his time as a Supreme Court Justice, Taft remained involved with
efforts to deepen and formalize international law, for example, by participating in I lnstitut international
de droit public. See Gaston J~ze, I 'nstitut international de droit public [The International Institute for
Public Law], 21 AM J. INT'L L. 768-69 (1927). In these efforts, he interacted with a group of French
scholars of public finance and debt, which was led by Gaston J~ze and may have included Alexander
Sack (who borrowed Jze's idea of "debts de regime"). See Ludington & Gulati, supra note 4, at 36
(citing SACK, supra note 4, at 157-58).
103. For a discussion of participation in American projects to promote the rule of law prior to
World War 1, see David S. Patterson, The United States and the Origins of the World Court, 91 POL. SCI.
Q. 279 (1976)
104. Taft himself stated his willingness to submit to arbitration even "a question of national
honor." HENRY F. PRINGLE, 2 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A BIOGRAPHY 737
(1939) (quoting XXIII ADDRESSES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 299). Commentators highlight that Taft
felt that any issue of international relations was ultimately justiciable, including those of vital national
interest. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 102, at 143 ("The underlying premise of the arbitration treaties as
Taft had them drafted was that advanced, civilized nations, sharing common values and histonc bonds,
must take the lead in demonstrating that no issue that might arise between them was not justiciable.").
Just after the publication of his award in the Tinoco decision, Taft stated himself personally "glad to help
judicial settlement of international controversies." Letter from W.H. Taft to H.D. Taft (Oct. 21, 1923),
quoted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 272 (1965).
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of-law requirement into the standards for judging and enforcing sovereign
obligations at the global level.
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III. THE OPENNESS OF A PRO-MARKET CONCEPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
There is the puzzling fact that Taft--of all people-is one of the
inadvertent founding fathers of a doctrine that is popular with advocates of
debt cancellation. As the twenty-seventh President and tenth Chief Justice of
the United States, Taft is best known domestically as an economic
conservative bordering on the reactionary. Internationally, he was the chief
architect of "dollar diplomacy," in which the U.S. government had been
accused of using its power to protect elite economic interests abroad.
Accounts of Taft as Chief Justice make scant (if any) note of his role in this
international arbitration, and it is worthwhile to ask what can be learned at a
policy level from the Tinoco decision. Reading Taft's ruling against his own
ideological tendencies undermines the idea that a commitment to the
sovereign credit market logically mandates a statist account of sovereignty.,
°6
While a requirement that creditors lend only to truly popular governments
could seriously burden the system, the intermediate conception of sovereignty
should cause less alarm.'
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This Part highlights a series of policy questions raised by the
intermediate or rule-of-law concept of sovereignty presented above. Does a
commitment to supporting the sovereign credit market mandate a purely statist
approach to sovereignty? Can the rule-of-law approach to sovereignty
presented in Taft's opinion be reconciled with a commitment to property
rights and investment stability in sovereign contracts? And why might an
intermediate approach be preferred over a strictly statist conception of
sovereignty? This Part first considers how the basic Tinoco finding effectively
uses international law to insulate foreign investment from political instability.
It then draws from Taft's domestic commitments to suggest how a rule-of-law
approach might be a better fit for the market in the long-run. Finally, the Part
highlights possible responses to the claim that the adoption of an odious debt-
type legal framework results in too much uncertainty to prove workable in
practice.
105. Unsurprisingly, early twentieth-century conservative lawyers-such as Taft-were at the
forefront of this approach to international law. Patterson highlights the impetus for this more
conservative legalist element as coming initially from "lawyers who wanted the United States to lead in
the quest for pacific alternatives to international violence but were reluctant to have their nation join in
boldly innovative schemes of world order involving potentially far-reaching limitations on national
sovereignty." Patterson, supra note 101, at 295.
106. It is interesting to point out that Alexander Sack was also consistently pro-creditor in his
writings. See Ludington & Gulati, supra note 4, at 21-25.
107. This Article does not intend to present Taft's framework as a specific policy program.
Indeed, a broader empirical study than is possible in this paper would be necessary for a definitive
recommendation. However, Taft's presentation of an intermediate rule-of-law conception of sovereignty
in sovereign lending, as well as his separate requirement of legitimate government purpose, should be
considered a feasible option in debates about sovereign debt.
2008]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33: 63
A. The Tinoco Case as a Pro-Investment Decision
Although Taft's decision is properly cited as a precedent for odious debt
cancellation, the Tinoco Case remains foundational to a basic commitment to
international lending and sovereign debt repayment. In concluding that the
Tinoco regime constituted Costa Rica's sovereign government, Taft
confirmed that even "illegitimate" and oppressive governments may enter into
binding sovereign contracts. By adopting the basic framework of effective
control-with rule of law and legitimate purpose modifications-he solidified
the continuity of sovereign statehood and sovereign obligations.' 0 8 As such,
Taft's ruling used international law to defend a relatively stable investment
environment.
Recall that sovereign continuity is the idea that Financial Times editors
considered so central to foreign investment, without which "there would be no
lending to governments."' 0 9 Taft's finding of a sovereign government in the
Tinoco regime may thus be understood as a victory for certainty in
investment-a boon to investors themselves and perhaps to those
governmental administrations that incorporate foreign borrowing into their
development strategies. As long as both the foreign creditor and the sovereign
government comply with the internal rule of law, then a sovereign contract
should be internationally enforceable. This would, of course, give all parties
advance notice of the legal rules to which they might be held, as Taft asserts
that the governing law of a contract ruling is the law in force at the time of the
contract.1 0 Even if the political circumstances of a sovereign borrower shift,
the country's international legal status, and thus the investor's legal rights,
remain the same.
It is important to note that Taft's insulation of stable legal rules from any
political changc works in both directions. It buffers against volatility in both
the creditor's home country (i.e., the United States or Great Britain in the
Tinoco Case) and in the borrowing country (i.e., Costa Rica). Taft marks a
clear distinction between a politically chosen national recognition policy and
his own ostensibly policy-neutral finding of sovereign recognition as a matter
of international law. "'I Thus, even if an investor's own country has not
recognized a foreign government as an implicit warning to its nationals not to
invest, an investor can feel secure of its property rights in international law.
As long as investors are willing to risk an inability to bring claims through
their own government through the mechanism of diplomatic protection-or
are willing to bet on a friendlier administration coming into power-they can
continue to engage in economic activity even with a nonrecognized regime.
Furthermore, under the Tinoco framework, the sovereign host or debtor
country cannot respond to the policy of a creditor's country with a counter-
108. As Taft points out in the J.B. Moore passage of Tinoco, this rule of "effective control" is
consistent with the idea of sovereign continuity. So long as we conceive of the sovereign as the juridical
body controlling the same territory and people, then the continuity of sovereign obligations makes sense.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
109. Iraq's Debt, supra note 2.
110. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369, 397 (1923), available
at 18 AM J. INT'L L. 147, 172 (1924).
Ill. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
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policy of its own (i.e., expropriation of American companies in retaliation for
U.S. nonrecognition), at least not in a way that would be recognized by
international law. Thus, investment and trade can continue even in the face of
one or both countries' opposing policy frameworks. Woodrow Wilson had, in
fact, made an effort to prevent American companies from working in Costa
Rica. He issued a directive stating that American companies could not expect
any diplomatic help from the U.S. government in the event of a dispute." 2
Chief Justice Taft's decision on recognition thus countered an investment-
unfriendly national policy with an investment-friendly international legal
finding, undermining the effectiveness of political decisions such as Wilson's
in the long run. At least in principle, Taft's finding removes companies from
the purview of either country's policy, effectively insulating investment,
trade, and property rights from politics at both ends. 113 In the sense of
protecting investment from political fluctuations, the Tinoco decision can be
seen as a precursor to procedures, such as those established by NAFTA, which
allow individual companies to bring claims against sovereign states without
the political considerations implicated by the traditional practice of diplomatic
protection.'14
Taft, of all people, may have been expected to support a favorable
environment for international investment, and his decision in Tinoco can be
seen as of a piece with his larger policy commitments. A substantial portion of
his foreign policy work as Secretary of War under Theodore Roosevelt, and in
his own Presidential administration, involved securing overseas environments
amenable to American investment and trade. Taft himself stated:
We believe it to be of the utmost importance that while our foreign policy should not be
turned a hair's breadth from the straight path of justice, it may be well made to include
active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for
profitable investment which shall insure to the benefit of both countries concerned....
[I]f the protection which the United States shall assure to her citizens in the assertion of
just rights under investment made in foreign countries, shall promote the amount of such
trade, it is a result to be commended. To call such diplomacy "dollar diplomacy" ... is to
ignore entirely a most useful office to be performed by a government in its dealings with
foreign governments. 11 5
112. Taft notes that the U.S. government warned investors on February 24, 1917 and reiterated
in April 1918 "that it will not consider any claims which may in the future anse from such [business]
dealings [with the Tinoco regime], worthy of its diplomatic support." Tinoco Case, I R. Int'l Arb.
Awards at 380, available at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 153.
113. Taft extended this analysis to other countries that had failed to recognize the Tinoco
regime, notably the United States's World War I allies, Great Britain and France, which he assumed
were deferring to the leadership of the United States. Id. at 381, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 153.
114. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605, 642-49 (formulating the Chapter 11, Section B requirements for bringing investor or enterprise
claims against a sovereign party before a NAFTA arbitration tribunal).
115. PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 678-79 (quoting XXIII ADDRESSES OF WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT 240-41). Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, offered a more critical
assessment of dollar diplomacy in a 1913 letter:
[T]o see Nicaragua struggling in the gnp of an oppressive financial agreement ... we see
in these transactions a perfect picture of dollar diplomacy. The financiers charge
excessive rates on the ground that they must be paid for the risk that they take and as
soon as they collect their pay for the risk, they then proceed to demand of the respective
governments that the risk shall be eliminated by governmental coercion. No wonder the
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Taft promoted investment and the involvement of American business in each
foreign policy area in which he was involved. In East Asia, where he served as
Governor of the Philippines, he championed the "open door" policy of
promoting trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.1 16 He helped to establish
customs receiverships through U.S. bank loans in the Caribbean and argued
for a trade agreement in the form of a reciprocity treaty with Canada.1 7 While
the geopolitical thrust of Taft's policies was very much in line with that of
Theodore Roosevelt, Taft's viewpoint was less classically realpolitik and
more economically oriented. 118 A consideration of Taft's broader foreign
policy commitments thus tends to support the argument that the Tinoco
decision was intended to promote an investment-friendly international legal
environment.
B. Rule of Law as a Pro-Market Approach
Although the nuances of Chief Justice Taft's approach changed over the
course of his career, at his 1921 appointment to the Supreme Court, the fact
that "the new Chief Justice was conservative, if not reactionary, in his political
and social views [was] not open to question. '1 19 Perhaps the most widespread
and somewhat caricatured view of Taft in American politics is as "a stubborn
defender of the status quo, champion of property rights, apologist for
privilege, and inveterate critic of social democracy." 120 In light of an
economically conservative background, is Taft's ultimate decision to
incorporate rule-of-law and legitimate purpose requirements an anomaly in an
otherwise pro-market opinion? At least from the perspective of investors and
borrowing government elites, a purely statist approach would seem preferable.
The latter guarantees the continuity of sovereign debt ud.,er all circumstances,
without injecting the additional requirement of good faith compliance with
internal legal rule and legitimate government purpose. If Taft's core
people of these little republics are aroused to revolution by what they regard as a sacrifice
of their interests.
4 RAY STANNARD BAKER, WOODROW WILSON: LIFE AND LETTERS 437-38 (1931), quoted in PRINGLE,
supra note 104, at 678. The Wilson administration, however, also followed many of the same
interventionist policies of its predecessors. The continued involvement of the United States in the
Caribbean, particularly through its interest in the Panama Canal, made it difficult for any supporter of
this larger geopolitical goal to seriously alter U.S. policy in Central America.
116. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 102. Nonetheless, Taft was considerably less successful in
establishing U.S. economic strength in East Asia than in Latin America. In China, the European powers
were far more entrenched, and Japan had embarked upon its own imperial plans. The open door policy
failed when faced with these established interests. See, e.g., WALTER V. SCHOLES & MARIE V. SCHOLES,
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION 247 (1970).
117. BURTON, supra note 102, at 79.
118. Taft considered "dollar diplomacy" a politically wise and economically savvy alternative
to "bullet diplomacy." As Scholes and Scholes present the intentions of the Taft administration, "[iln
practical terms dollar diplomacy meant economic intervention to stave off military intervention or, as
the Administration was fond of saying, it meant the use of dollars instead of bullets." SCHOLES &
SCHOLES, supra note 116, at 35.
119. "To Taft, clearly, the difference between conservatism and radicalism was the difference
between right and wrong, between the known and the unknown, between the sound and the unsound."
PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 967.
120. MASON, supra note 104, at 13.
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commitment was to purely investor-oriented international law, these
additional legal requirements and the ultimate finding against Great Britain
would be truly puzzling.
On closer study, Taft's ideological approach is less simplistic than the
big business caricature frequently placed upon him. The nuances of Taft's
ideological predispositions, which unified property protection with judicial
reform and which distinguished policies that favored business from those that
favored particular businessmen, can help shed light on the practical
ramifications of his approach in Tinoco. In particular, it suggests that what
appears to be progressive reform may in fact be supportive of a fairly
conservative, pro-market framework in sovereign lending. This Section first
considers how a commitment to the intermediate or rule-of-law conception of
sovereignty-even when it disadvantages investors in the short run-may be a
market-friendly policy in the long run. It then highlights how an ability to
distinguish between market interests and creditor interests encourages caution
with regard to potential moral hazard problems on the part of creditors and
sovereign government elites.
1. Rule of Law as a Bulwark Against Broader Disorder
The unexpected dualism in the Tinoco decision, which modifies an
effective control test for sovereignty with a commitment to internal legal rule
and legitimate government purpose, mirrors the dualism inherent in Taft's
own domestic policy. In addition to a general commitment to business
interests and private property, Taft was a strong advocate of judicial reform.
During the early 1920s, Taft led an administrative reform effort that aimed to
make courts more effective and equitable. He was particularly concerned
with unequal access to the courts based on wealth and with the corrosive
effect this had on the administration of justice. 122 Commentators have
suggested that this dualism of Taft as both an economic conservative and a
judicial reformer comes together in his paramount and ultimately conventional
concern for law, order, and stability. Reading Tinoco in this context hints at a
similar interpretation of Taft's perspective at the international level.
In line with legal classicism, Taft was committed domestically to the
promotion of capitalism and the protection of private IProperty, and he viewed
law as protection against instability and radicalism. According to analysts
of his time on the Supreme Court, Taft considered that "law, the rock of
civilization, made for certainty and order amid inevitable economic and social
flux." 124 Property protection stood at the core of Taft's judicial ideology, and
during his time as Chief Justice in the 1920s, Taft was particularly concerned
about populist attacks on property rights and on the judiciary. 125 In discussing
121. Taft had long been concerned with judicial reform and made it one of his central activities
upon his appointment as Chief Justice in 1921. Burton has a good description of Taft's court projects
during the 1920s. BURTON, supra note 102, at 115-21.
122. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 104, at 53.
123. See id. at 15.
124. Id. at 290.
125. Taft considered the judiciary to be, among other things, the institution designed for the
protection of property rights. Id. at 291.
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Taft's major 1908 address before the Virginia Bar Association, Alpheus
Mason describes Taft's view as follows:
One way to undermine the social reformer's crusade was to meet his legitimate demands
for evenhanded justice. Leveling gross inequalities between rich and poor at the bar of
justice would remove a major source of social unrest. Improved judicial machinery would
make courts potentially more effective safeguards of private property and, perhaps, help
disarm its most dangerous enemies-socialists, communists, and progressives.
In this regard, Taft's goal of fair judicial access may have been part and parcel
of his general conservatism. Thus, legal progressivism on Taft's part is not
inconsistent with a commitment to maintaining the status quo. In addition to
feeling genuine concern for wealth-based inequality in access to justice, Taft
would also have been aware of the risks to property and capital of doing
nothing. Taft noted that the unequal burden on the poor litigant constituted
"'the inequality that exists in our present administration of justice, and that
sooner or later is certain to rise and trouble us, and to call for popular
condemnation and reform.' t 27 Indeed, Taft viewed the proper administration
of law as a bulwark against more serious social demands, in addition to an end
in itself. Thus, part of a Taftian strategy for the promotion of market-friendly
policy would involve the elimination of the most egregious violations of
social justice.
This insight forces the question of whether the intermediate conception
of sovereignty underlying the Tinoco decision-also relatively progressive-
can be understood as supportive of market ideals. This would problematize the
view that only a narrowly statist conception of effective control, along with
the strictest doctrine of sovereign continuity, is suitable for the treatment of
sovereign debt. Although some modem creditors treat the odious debt issue as
a slippery slope to the collapse of sovereign lending. 128 understanding Taft's
own background presents a different interpretation. While it is possible that
Taft felt concern for the debt payment burdens of neighboring countries, he
certainly would not have been a proponent of widespread debt relief. He
presented the Tinoco decision not as a grand indictment of the lack of genuine
agency for borrowing countries, but as a fairly narrow requirement for
sovereign loans to comply with internal laws and to serve a legitimate
government purpose. Taft's domestic support for the traditionally progressive
cause of legal reform at least partially aimed to prevent deeper and less
disciplined calls for social justice. Consistent with these preferences in the
domestic arena, Taft believed internationally in "respect for law,
constitutional and statute, which would bring about a disciplined international
community, just as it had for a domestic society in the advanced nations." 129
Taft's commitment to using legal principles as a shield against violent
controversy and disorder extended beyond American borders. Although at
both the domestic and international levels Taft seemed most interested in the
126. Id. at 13-14.
127. Id. at 53 (quoting W.H. Taft, President of the U.S., Address at the Virginia Bar
Association (Aug. 6, 1908)).
128. See, eg., Rajan,supra note 7, at 54-55.
129. BURTON, supra note 102, at 115.
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procedural aspect of equal justice, the substantive outcome of his decision for
Costa Rica makes sense within this larger strategy. Granting basic fairness in
the international arbitral arena can be understood as a stopgap measure against
more serious questions about global economic justice. Eliminating the most
egregious violations of transnational justice may well be part of a broader
market-friendly policy for sovereign lending.
2. The Risk of Moral Hazard on the Part of Creditors and
Government Elites
However one judges Taft's political philosophy, it did seem to be guided
by genuine capitalist beliefs rather than short-run pandering to particular
capitalists. Although Taft's policy and judicial decisions generally favored
business interests, his genuine orientation was to the market as a point of
principle.' 30 Indeed, he showed himself willing to take positions antithetical to
major American interests in order to serve a broader commitment to smooth
economic and market functioning. Although Taft counseled very slow-moving
social legislation, he did admit that the excesses of big business might require
"a limitation upon the use of property and capital." 13 1 During his 1907
presidential nomination, he attacked the "use of accumulated wealth in illegal
ways" and, according to his major biographers, he was concerned that
"[u]nless the abuses under it were stopped, capitalism would be replaced by
socialism or some other evil."'' 32 In short, Taft was able to distinguish between
elite business interests and market interests more generally, and when he
perceived a conflict between these commitments, he favored the latter.
This ability to distinguish between market and creditor interests offers
another critical layer to the Tinoco decision. Even beyond the idea that a rule-
of-law approach can act as a bulwark against broader social demands, there
are two ways in which an intermediate account may promote efficient market
functioning-albeit at the expense of immediate profits. Although a strict
statist conception encourages stability in repayment, it can also create harmful
incentives for creditors and borrowing government elites. In particular, a
statist approach to sovereign continuity produces a moral hazard problem by
acting as insurance that loans-regardless of provenance or use-will be
enforced against subsequent regimes. This moral hazard exists at both the
creditor level and the borrowing country level. Adopting an intermediate
approach may mitigate this problematic aspect of the current statist lending
system.
The International Monetary Fund defines moral hazard as existing,
"when the provision of insurance against a risk encourages behavior that
130. His view of major corporate actors was decidedly mixed. He wrote in a letter to his
brother, "[a]s you say, Wall Street, as an aggregation, is the biggest ass that I have ever run across."
Letter from W.H. Taft to Henry Taft (Feb. 21, 1910), quoted in PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 655.
131 William Howard Taft, The People Rule: Mr. Taft's Reply to Mr. Bryan at Hot Springs,
Virginia (August 21, 1908), quoted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT. CHIEF
JUSTICE 52 (1965). In prosecuting the major monopolies of the day, Taft perhaps "attempted much more,
far less noisily, than [Theodore] Roosevelt." PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 654.
132. PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 655.
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makes that risk more likely."'1 33 Part of the concern with giving more traction
to the conceptual frameworks associated with odious debt may be that
successor regimes would fail to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate debt, and would attempt to repudiate all debt under the guise of
odiousness.134 It is possible that a poorly constructed odious debt framework
would encourage this kind of reckless repudiation of loans, which would
aggravate the preexisting problems of uncertainty associated with sovereign
lending. In practice, however, this kind of recklessness seems unlikely to
develop. As Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran point out, "[c]urrently,
countries repay debt even if it is odious because if they failed to do so, their
assets might be seized abroad and their reputations would be tarnished,
making it more difficult for them to borrow again or attract foreign
investment."' 35 These basic policing mechanisms need only be minimally
altered by the introduction of an odious debt framework, such as that offered
in the Tinoco decision. The only changed element would be the catalyst for
this compliance mechanism; instead of being triggered by repudiation or
major default alone, it would be triggered by the repudiation of debt not
considered "odious." The repudiation of only that portion of debt found to be
odious or illegitimate should not, ideally, result in retaliation against overseas
assets or a country's general creditworthiness.136
In fact, under the current system of strict sovereign continuity, two
opposite moral hazard concerns seem to have prevailed. First, the norm of
universal repayment, by failing to distinguish between different types of debt,
has created a moral hazard problem with regard to creditors. A strict statist
account insures against the risk of lending to sovereign states (even arguably
"illegitimate" states) in times of crisis and uncertainty. Ideally, this should
allow for the productive use of capital even in the face of political volatility.
The effect of a purely statist conception, however, seems to have gone beyond
this to encourage greater (and perhaps unthinking) lending for questionable
ends. It minimizes the risks associated with wasteful lending and shifts
additional risk onto borrowing states by absolving creditors of part of their
standard due diligence requirement.1 37 Folding in and forcing the repayment
133. This definition is presented in INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 8
(1998), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/weoO598/index.htm.
134. Jayachandran and Kremer address these concerns and raise counterarguments in their
work on odious debt. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5. Joseph Hanlon raises the moral hazard
problem with regard to Rwanda and South Africa. Joseph Hanlon, Dictators and Debt, JUBILEE
RESEARCH, Nov. 1998, http://www.jubileeresearch.org/analysis/reports/dictatorsreport.htm. See also
Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, 2002 BROOKINGS INST. POL'Y BRIEF 103.
135. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 134, at 4.
136. Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu Gulati, among others, explicitly consider the possibility of
partial repudiation of odious debts. Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts? A
Framework for an Optimal Liability Regime, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-970553.
137. The sovereign credit market, as with any credit market, entails risks on the part of both the
borrower and the lender. The borrower generally accepts the risk that its investment of borrowed funds
may not result in a cash flow sufficient for repayment; a failed investment in and of itself does not
absolve the obligation to repay. The lender generally accepts some risk as well: it must ensure that the
borrower is able and willing to follow through on its obligation, i.e., not default on its loans or declare
bankruptcy. To that end, creditors generally engage in due diligence to determine the financial viability
of the borrower, and also to reasonably assure themselves that the individual or entity signing the debt
contract is competent to bind the ultimate payer of the debt.
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of arguably odious debt with all other sovereign debt effectively obviates any
risk of lending to regimes that violate their own laws or plan to use funds for
non-beneficial purposes. The intermediate approach taken by Taft in Tinoco,
in both its rule-of-law and its legitimate purpose requirements, might help to
direct the international capital stock back to more productive and more
transparent uses.' 38
The intermediate approach of the Tinoco decision should also encourage
better domestic policy decisions by borrowing governments in the long run.
Currently, sovereign states have relatively easy access to capital through
international markets, which may be willing to lend for insufficiently
considered purposes and through processes that violate internal legal rules.
This effectively creates a corresponding borrower-side moral hazard problem.
Just as a strictly statist approach to sovereign lending encourages creditors to
lend in uncertain political times, it encourages sovereign states to borrow in
the knowledge that future generations will repay the debt. 139 Ideally, this
would allow all states (again including those of unsavory origin) to make
timely and well-priced investments in infrastructure, healthcare, and other
productive assets and services. However, strict sovereign continuity may also
have the perverse effect of encouraging profligate borrowing for non-state
purposes and in contravention of the transparency associated with internal
legal rule. This means that government leaders with access to international
capital have less need to draw on public resources and are therefore even less
accountable to their publics. 1
40
In contrast, the type of intermediate framework offered in Tinoco, by
limiting the pool of external funds available illegally or for non-beneficial
purposes, might eventually encourage state actors to confront more squarely
the political and economic risks of corruption and repression. Future regimes
would not have the same (often externally derived) resources at hand as
regimes past. This should limit the rents extractable from being a member of
the ruling elite and may increase domestic leverage for internal reform. In
short, as long as we distinguish between market interests and elite interests,
and pay careful attention to the incentives created by different conceptions of
138. 1 mean "productive" here in the more colloquial sense of using capital to produce goods,
services, or infrastructure beneficial to underlying populations. The term may also be used in a purely
financial description of capital as productive when it generates financial returns, for example in the form
of dividends or interest payments Certainly sovereign lending has occasionally been productive of
interest payments even when gains on the ground have been minimal. The Bataan nuclear power plant in
the Philippines is a prime example. Built at a total cost of $2.3 billion on an earthquake fault line, it has
yet to generate usable energy. RP Pays Off Nuclear Power Plant After 30 Years, ABS-CBN
INTERACTIVE, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/topofthehour.aspx?Storyld=80742 (last visited Nov 6,
2007).
139. Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson call this the "intergenerational tension" in sovereign
borrowing. Buchheit et al., supra note I, at 1204-08.
140. Patricia Adams points out that one problem of "loose lending" is that it severs the
relationship that a ruling elite has with a state's population. In addition to providing elites with
additional and often unaccountable funds (with which they can oppress the population), the government
is not forced to deal with the oversight and accountability questions generally associated with raising
taxes. ADAMS, supra note 5, at 151-56.
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sovereignty, compelling reasons related to economic efficiency exist for an
intermediate approach to sovereignty in sovereign debt.
4 1
C. Dealing with Uncertainty in Taft's Intermediate Account
Even if an intermediate rule-of-law account might promote a stable
market environment in the long run, contemporary economists have been
hesitant to embrace anything other than a strictly statist approach as consistent
with the everyday operation of the sovereign lending system. Whereas a statist
conception allows for a bright line rule--continuity of debt obligations in all
cases-the potential gains associated with an intermediate approach require
greater intellectual labor on the part of the sovereign debt regime. An
intermediate framework injects uncertainty and variability into sovereign
lending. This Section addresses several of these reservations and highlights
where the Tinoco decision provides a mechanism for dealing with the
additional uncertainty caused by its rule of law and governmental purpose
requirements.
Given the absence of a clear enforcement mechanism in the international
arena (i.e., the lack of a unified judicial and executive system), international
borrowing is especially susceptible to concerns of uncertainty about
repayment. The strict statist account of sovereignty, by effectively assuring
creditors that all of their loans are enforceable under international law, makes
credit to sovereign borrowers relatively plentiful and cheap. Without the
assurance that debts will be repaid even in cases of regime change or political
volatility, creditors may be more hesitant to accept the risk of sovereign
lending. Even if they remain willing to lend, increased risk could raise the
price (i.e., interest) charged to sovereign borrowers, potentially putting
international financing out of reach for the poorest among them.
Taft's Tinoco decision does inject several elements that make the
repayment of sovereign debt less certain. Although Taft's "effective control"
test supports a stable investment environment by promoting the general rule of
sovereign continuity, it allows greater flexibility in the repayment of
sovereign debt obligations. The requirement that sovereign contracts must
comply with the sovereign's own internal laws raises two questions that must
be addressed by lenders and borrowers. First, what is the relevant domestic
law in place for any given sovereign contract; i.e., which law grants the
government agent power to act on behalf of the state? Ideally, this law will be
easily accessible and clearly formulated (as was the case, incidentally, in the
Tinoco controversy as to the Amory oil concession's tax provisions).
However, there are likely to be situations in which the law itself is unclear.
And second-for the creditor-has the sovereign borrower actually complied
with the domestic law such that the contract will be enforceable under
international law? This question too might be difficult to answer, particularly
from the perspective of a foreign creditor. The requirement of legitimate
141. Although I have focused on Taft's framework, this analysis is relevant beyond his
particular approach, and similar gains could be made through other modes of dealing with arguably
odious debt. For example, Kremer and Jayachandran model the economic equilibrium that would result
from establishing a prospective odious debt regime. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 134.
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governmental purpose similarly raises two questions: What constitutes
"legitimate government purpose" under international law? And has the
sovereign contractor actually complied with this requirement?
While it would certainly be simpler to ignore these questions in favor of
a strictly statist account, which assumes that all debts will be repaid, Taft does
offer a mechanism to deal with these issues. In discussing the Royal Bank
loan to the Tinoco brothers, Taft implies that a crucial consideration is
whether the creditor "must have known" or "should have" known that the loan
funds had no "legitimate government purpose." 142 This language indicates that
actual knowledge of the loan's beneficial or detrimental intent is not
necessary to grant or deny repayment of a loan. What would be required is
that the creditors make a reasonable effort to investigate and attempt to answer
the questions presented above. Creditors must comply in good faith with the
sovereign contractor's domestic rule of law and with the general insistence
that "government" debt should go to government ends. The Tinoco decision
effectively incorporates a due diligence requirement-if not actual creditor
knowledge-for these issues, which is otherwise weak in the strict statist
account. 143 Given the serious moral hazard problems noted above, such a
requirement might actually encourage greater productive use of international
capital stocks.
Still, it is important to acknowledge that this due diligence element does
not clear up all of the uncertainty involved in the intermediate account. Some
aspects of the finding, such as the nuances of "legitimate governmental
purpose," are inherently ambiguous at the edges and may depend on
ultimately normative and contextual considerations.1 44 The finding also makes
the potentially problematic suggestion that international arbitral tribunals
would decide on whether a sovereign government had complied sufficiently
with its own laws. These elements thus inject an international social judgment
on domestic regime issues through the back door-something that a purely
legalist account (if such a thing exists) would seek to avoid.
While these problems of interpretation are difficult and deserve
additional attention, they can be mitigated. For example, states entering into
sovereign debt arbitrations could consent to arbitral determinations on a range
of their internal laws (which would presumably still be preferable to having
their internal laws ignored altogether). Alternatively, arbitral tribunals could
be required to consist of judges from the debtor state's political or
142. Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 369, 394 (1923), available
at 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 168 (1924). Again, a requirement of creditor knowledge also emerges in
Sack's presentation of the odious debt doctrine, although Sack's formulation does not explicitly address
the possibility of constructive knowledge. SACK, supra note 4, at 157.
143. For more on the due diligence requirement, see supra notes 79, 137.
144. Taft's finding explicitly distinguishes legitimate lending for public ends (presumably
infrastructure, services, and the like) from illegitimate lending for private enrichment. While this is the
most clear cut example, questions could be raised as to whether the suppression of popular protest
constitutes legitimate government action-particularly given the fine line between "keeping order" and
repression. Sack's formulation seems to suggest that funds incurred for military oppression would be
illegitimate (presuming of course that all three prongs of his test had been met). See supra note 84.
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geographical region or from a shared legal tradition. 145 It is also important to
highlight that the alternative of a narrowly statist conception already implicitly
makes such social judgments; a strict framework of sovereign continuity
effectively determines that compliance with internal laws and attentiveness to
legitimate government purpose are of limited importance.
Given that many arguments for a strict statist approach are formulated as
protective of sovereign borrowers, it is worth considering that the intermediate
alternative might still be preferable from the long-run perspective of the
borrowing country. Debt cancellation advocates point out that, under the
current lending framework of strict sovereign continuity, many of the world's
poorest countries use a considerable proportion of their GDPs for the payment
of loans of questionable provenance and utility.146 In combination with the
serious problems engendered by the current statist approach discussed above,
Taft's implied mechanism for dealing with questions of uncertainty should
encourage serious discussion of the Tinoco Case as a workable precedent. At
the very least, the decision should disarm the charge that any deviation from a
strict statist principle of sovereign continuity is unworkable in principle.
Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the creditor response to Taft's
finding for Costa Rica was far less alarmist at the time of the decision than
today's discussions of the odious debt idea. Although Taft's intermediate
conception of sovereignty in sovereign debt promotes investment stability, the
requirements of legitimate government purpose and basic rule of law preclude
a windfall to creditors. The practical or interest group ramifications of this
creditor and market dynamic seem clear. One would predict that creditors (and
their lawyers) would always have a strong preference for a strictly statist
version of sovereignty, which ensures the repayment of debt under all
circumstances. Notwithstanding this expectation, most commentators in the
1920s seemed unperturbed by Taft's arbitral award for Costa Rica. The British
Yearbook of International Law covered solely the basic discussion on
sovereign recognition, adding only that, "[o]n the merits of the British claims
the Arbitrator's decision was on the whole favorable to Costa Rica, but this
part of his opinion is of less general interest."' 147 The Wall Street Journal
merely reported Taft's decision for Costa Rica on both the bank note and the
oil concession claims, without any additional editorialization. 48 By 1924-
two years after the legislation repudiating Tinoco's debts and one year after
the arbitral award-Costa Rica was able to float loans in both the United
States and France to regain its financial footing. 149 Although there may have
been more anger in British foreign policy circles, this did not significantly
145. To some degree, this can already be controlled for, as parties to an arbitration have input
into the selection of the tribunal members. An additional requirement would place some constraint on
the choices of creditors in selecting a tribunal member.
146. For a 1998 review of estimated "odious debt" burdens, see Hanlon, supra note 134. For a
provocative account in the popular publishing trade, see JAMES S. HENRY, THE BLOOD BANKERS: TALES
FROM THE GLOBAL UNDERGROUND ECONOMY (2003).
147. J.L.B., Arbitration Between Great Britain and Costa Rica, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 199, 204
(1925).
148. Costa Rica Wins Amory Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1923, at 4. American newspaper
reports tended to focus on the oil concession rather than the bank loan.
149. Costa Rica Shows Big Financial Gain, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1928, at 33.
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hinder Costa Rica's financial flexibility or cause its banishment from the
sovereign credit market. In a similarly puzzling instance around the same
time, some bankers and industrialists were willing to extend credit to the
Soviet Union even after its repudiation of the Tsar's debt in 1917.150 In short,
the creditor response to Taft's decision, and thus implicitly to its underlying
theory of sovereignty, was not consistently hostile.
Unlike their contemporary descendants, early twentieth-century
financiers did not uniformly consider a strict statist conception of sovereignty
their due. The relatively moderate response of these early creditors raises the
question of why today's financial actors have become less responsive to any
deviation from a narrow conception of sovereign continuity and a
concomitantly strict practice of debt repayment. The puzzle only deepens in
light of Taft's own reconciliation of his economic conservatism with a more
flexible conception of sovereignty, which unified internal transparency with a
commitment to legitimate governmental purpose.
IV. CREDITOR COMPETITION AND REALPOLITIK IN THE CARIBBEAN
Analyzing the Tinoco decision in light of Taft's pro-market ideological
tendencies counters the claim of some modern financial actors that only a
strict statist approach to sovereignty is consistent with healthy sovereign credit
markets. This practical open-endedness emphasizes that ideas of economic
rationality, sound market practice, and sovereign creditworthiness are
theoretically and historically contingent. It also raises an additional question:
if there is variation in the idea of sovereignty underlying these concepts, what
accounts for this variation?
The following discussion looks briefly at the political and economic
context of the Tinoco decision to formulate an initial hypothesis for this more
social scientific question. It first suggests that the degree of competition in the
sovereign credit market may affect the openness of the conception of
sovereignty underlying sovereign debt. In times when creditors are
competitive and perceive each other as significant risks, the conception of
sovereignty is likely to be more flexible and receptive to the claims of
sovereign debtors. However, when creditors are less competitive and perceive
themselves as part of the same interest group, a more strictly statist approach
is likely to dominate. The discussion then highlights how this dynamic plays
out in the context of early twentieth-century British-American rivalry in the
Caribbean, which may have given Taft leeway for his finding and encouraged
creditors to be more flexible in their approach.
A. The Openness of a Pro-Creditor Concept of Sovereignty
The analysis above makes clear that the seemingly abstract question of
who is "sovereign" in sovereign debt in fact has significant distributional
consequences in international economic relations. A strictly statist account of
150. See, eg, ANTONY SUTTON, WALL STREET AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION (1974)
(highlighting economic links between the Soviet Union and major American bankers and industnalists
through the 1920s).
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sovereignty, in which the fact of state control is sufficient regardless of the
internal mechanism of control, supports the repayment of debt regardless of
any internal governmental illegitimacy. Disregarding even Taft's minimal
conception of internal rule of law and legitimate purpose as a factor in
sovereign lending would allow occasional windfalls to creditors. In asking
why an intermediate conception failed to gain strength over the course of the
twentieth century, one immediate hypothesis therefore rests with the
increasing power of creditors. Following this line of reasoning, the defense of
a strict statist account of sovereignty in sovereign debt should intensify along
with increased creditor power.
Such a hypothesis, while initially plausible, offers an insufficiently
nuanced view of creditor interests. In particular, this "creditor power"
hypothesis fails to recognize that while creditors may at times have shared
perceptions of interest and threat, tending toward a strict statist approach, such
creditor consolidation is not inevitable. At some historical moments, creditors
may actively compete and thus identify other lenders as primary threats. In
such cases, the conception of sovereignty underlying sovereign lending is
likely to be more receptive to sovereign debtor concerns. A more nuanced
version of the "creditor interest" hypothesis suggests that the degree to which
creditors are competitive or consolidated-rather than creditor power in
general-should affect the narrowness or openness of the conception of
sovereignty underlying the sovereign debt regime.
How would this dynamic play out in practice? Creditors do incorporate
the possibility of political instability and regime change when assessing
country risk. In this context, lenders may pay attention to sovereign legitimacy
if they believe that the debt contracts of less oppressive regimes will result in
higher rates of repayment even in the absence of a clear odious debt
mechanism. 151 However, creditors have no foundational need for a discussion
of whether sovereign borrowers are internally "legitimate." Under the statist
background rules of the current financial system, lenders are entitled to the
repayment of all debt. Therefore, they are unlikely to consider independently
the explicit questions of sovereign legitimacy raised by different conceptual
frameworks in political theory and international law. The sovereignty issue in
sovereign debt is likely to remain in the background until pressed by a
sovereign government, either upon repudiation or when seeking to borrow
after a repudiation or default. As such, a creditor's receptiveness to borrower
government claims will be central to how competition or consolidation affect
conceptions of sovereignty in international debt.
Although it is fairly common to speak of "creditor interests," such
imprecise language effectively expresses a noncompetitive or oligopolistic
perspective. There is little reason to expect that creditor interests in the arena
of sovereign debt will be entirely uniform, given that they respond to two
151. This would still be done on an ad hoc basis, particularly given that major sovereign credit
rating mechanisms remain relatively subjective. See, e.g., Ashok Vir Bhatia, Sovereign Credit Ratings
Methodology: An Evaluation 12 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/02/170, 2002) (noting that "the limited
predictability" of sovereign economic and political behavior, as well as the absence of widespread
statistical testing, "leave[] the task of credit ratings assessment[s] poorly suited to formulaic
straightjackets").
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principal sources of risk. First, creditors as a whole face the threat of default
and repudiation, and in this sense have a shared perspective vis-A-vis
sovereign debtors. Debtors, however, are not the only, or even the most
pressing, source of risk for creditors; other lenders constitute a second threat.
A healthy credit market is driven partially by competition between suppliers
of credit for the same borrowing client. The prospect of losing clients to
competitors represents a second central problem for creditors.
152
How might this framework inform conceptions of sovereignty
underlying sovereign debt? As long as major creditors identify non-repayment
of loans as the central threat in the sovereign market, then a hegemonic
insistence on the payment of all debt, including potentially odious debt, makes
sense. 153 The concept of sovereignty that best supports such a practice-a
purely statist definition accompanied by a strict doctrine of sovereign
continuity-would gain greater support. This creditor approach should be
more likely to emerge when the market is oligopolistic, in which case the
threat posed by competing suppliers of credit recedes. In this case, the risk of
sovereign default becomes dominant, and creditors interpret their own
interests and risks as intertwined with those of their fellow creditors. As such,
they will be more hostile toward debtors who refuse to pay previous loans and
less solicitous of the views of potential borrowers. Borrowers facing a limited
set of intermediaries for capital will have little recourse but to accept the terms
set by these creditors working together. In an oligopolistic situation in which
the interest of one is the interest of all, creditors will have little incentive to
accept claims based on a non-statist view of sovereignty. Even if one creditor
considered the odious debt argument valid, its relationship with other
creditors, including the discontented debt-holder, could prevent its acceptance
of a more flexible approach. Although it is difficult to place a monetary value
on the exclusive adoption of a concept, the dominant use of a statist definition
of sovereignty-with its occasional windfalls to creditors-effectively grants
a conceptual monopoly as financially valuable as any other monopoly. Over
time, this conceptual monopoly can gain the appearance of naturalness or
inevitability, making alternative approaches to sovereignty seem
impracticable, and so shaping the underlying theoretical context of sovereign
lending in the long run.
154
However, in a genuinely competitive market in which creditors view not
only the sovereign debtor but also fellow creditors as risks, the preferred
definition of sovereignty should not be so uniform. In this case, creditors may
be more anxious to protect their links to existing clients and to lure new
clients away from competitors. While the holder of a particular debt
152. This vision primarily applies to bank lending, but the form of competition for bond issues
may be somewhat different. The distinction between bonds and bank loans will be discussed as part of a
larger project on sovereignty and sovereign debt in the twentieth century.
153. Such creditors may include private financial houses, bank groups, international financial
institutions, and major creditor governments. Credit rating agencies, organizations such as the Paris and
London Clubs, and other institutions involved in the sovereign lending regime could also conceivably
play a role in this dynamic of competition and consolidation.
154. Although this presentation is set forth in rationalist terms, it is unlikely that creditor
institutions self-consciously go through these steps of rationalization. In situations of consolidation, it is
more likely that a statist view has been naturalized and assumed necessary.
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instrument will prefer a statist conception of sovereignty as to that instrument,
other creditors hoping to attract the same borrower may be more flexible. A
new creditor, in the hopes of displacing a competitor, may be indifferent as to
whether a prospective client pays that competitor's arguably illegitimate debt.
This underlying desire could reasonably lead to a more flexible perspective on
the "sovereign" in sovereign debt and a weaker insistence on the doctrine of
sovereign continuity. So long as a potential borrower looks like a good credit
risk overall, a new creditor may be willing to extend credit even after
repudiation.155 Thus, a more aggressive credit market should be more lenient
toward sovereign governments that repudiate arguably illegitimate debt.
Questioning the idea of a monolithic creditor interest in sovereign
lending only makes more apparent how the conception of sovereignty
underlying the sovereign debt regime is historically contingent. Two
alternative logics exist for creditor preferences, depending on the nature of
competition in the sovereign credit market. Although it is impossible to verify
the general applicability of this proposal in a single case study, the creditor
competition hypothesis can help to provide context for the intermediate
approach to sovereignty taken by Taft in the Tinoco decision.
B. Economic Competition and Realpolitik in the Caribbean
While Taft's Tinoco decision and its underlying vision of sovereignty
provides stability and certainty for international investment, its shift away
from a strictly statist account precluded a finding for the British creditors.
Although it is common to hear talk of "creditor interests," in fact such
interests are not necessarily unified. Drawing from the previous analysis, this
Section suggests that the relative nuance and flexibility of Taft's Tinoco
position may have been enabled by the backgound context of competition
between the United States and its European rivals. Such competition, with
Great Britain in particular, ruled out an easy identification of creditor interests
and thus may have moderated the statist conceptual monopoly that seems to
have dominated the late twentieth century. This competition existed along
both economic and geostrategic dimensions, and was deepened by U.S.
concerns about oil concessions and the Panama Canal. Given Chief Justice
Taft's extensive foreign policy experience as both President and Secretary of
War under Theodore Roosevelt, he would have been aware of the broader
ramifications of his finding in the Tinoco Case. The point here is not that Taft
decided in favor of Costa Rica to obstruct British regional involvement,
although this strict realist hypothesis could be tested more thoroughly. 156
Rather, this Section argues that the competitive context of early twentieth-
century lending may have challenged the insufficiently nuanced
understandings of market rationality that have become prevalent today.
155. Repudiation on the ground of odious debt is not necessarily a large-scale repudiation of all
the sovereign state's debt. It is possible that the "odious" label applies to only a portion of the public
debt. Indeed, some debt cancellation advocates have proposed calculations of different countries' odious
debt burdens. See, e.g., Tamen, supra note 39, app. I, at 25 (' alculating "dictator"-contracted debt
burdens for twenty-three countries).
156. Unfortunately, Taft's biographers make very little (if any) mention of the Tinoco
arbitration. It is unclear how Taft himself viewed the case in the context of Caribbean competition.
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Part of Taft's foreign policy as President involved supporting American
banks in their early efforts to break into areas already supplied by European
powers and their financiers. In the early twentieth century, American capital
sought investment outlets and struggled against the market dominance of
British, French, and German banking houses. In China, Taft's presidential
administration displayed far greater concern than previous administrations
with promoting concessions for American banks and corporations.1 57 These
earlier efforts failed in part because of the relative immaturity of American
capital markets, but also due to the intransigence of Japanese and European
interests in the region. 158 The rise of the United States as a creditor nation
accelerated after World War I, but it had still not solidified its hegemonic
status. Although the Unites States was relatively stronger in Latin America,
particularly after the war, British capital continued to prevail through most of
the 1920s.15 9 While U.S. investments in Latin America doubled to $3 billion
between 1924 and 1929, British investments dominated the region throughout
this time period. 160 This background of economic competition undermines the
tenability of a unified concept of creditor interest in the early twentieth
century. Although Taft may have aimed to promote market and creditor
interests generally, in line with his economic conservatism, the precise content
of such interests remained in flux. According to the competitive creditor logic
outlined above, this may have enabled more openness in framing the concepts
and legal approaches to sovereignty in the sovereign debt market of the 1920s.
This economically competitive context was only enhanced by
geopolitical considerations. While the United States viewed Great Britain and
other Western European nations as an economic risk, this would have
constituted only part of Taft's foreign policy outlook. American support for
overseas investment was matched, if not superceded, by geostrategic
concerns. The Taft presidency was committed to opening foreign markets as
an independent goal, but also aimed to use private capital as an instrument for
promoting stable and solvent governments in areas of geopolitical concem.
Particularly in Latin America, Taft was deeply concerned with defending
broader U.S. strategic interests.16 1 The Tinoco coup and the arbitration took
place in the twilight of imperial competition in the Caribbean and at the dawn
of American global hegemony. As early as 1823, the Monroe Doctrine
asserted that the newly independent Latin American countries constituted part
157. SCHOLES & SCHOLES, supra note 116, at 109.
158. Id at 247-48.
159. The British had historically been interested in establishing a Central American foothold in
the Spanish Empire and founded a logging colony at present day Belize as early as 1622. Leonard, supra
note 20, at 4.
160. Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, the United States, and the European Powers,
1830-1930, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 83, 112 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1986).
161. Scholes and Scholes argue that, for Taft, the "most important consideration was the
preservation of vital American interests abroad." SCHOLES & SCHOLES, supra note 116, at 105. They
suggest that Taft's use of private capital was analogous to Truman's use of public capital as a method
for political and economic stabilization abroad after World War 1I. Id.; see also MUNRO, supra note 17,
at 163 ("[T]o Taft, using dollars instead of bullets seemed humane and practical .... "). Commentators
have remarked upon the unity of the motivating factors behind Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson's approaches
to the Latin American and particularly the Caribbean countries. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KRYZANEK, U.S.-
LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 51 (3d ed. 1996).
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of an American sphere of influence, and declared that any European attempts
at control would be viewed, "as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
to the United States." 162 The United States's interest in the Caribbean only
deepened when it launched its overseas empire in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines after the Spanish-American War. 163 The 1904 Roosevelt Corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine went even further, claiming an international police
power in the Western Hemisphere to correct "chronic wrongdoing" or
disorder resulting from any "general loosening of the ties of civilized
society." 164 As part of his corollary, Theodore Roosevelt hoped to prevent
intervention by European powers claiming to protect their national interests in
the Caribbean. The central preventive policy of this larger strategy involved
the promotion of stable and solvent Caribbean governments and the limitation
of new European economic interests in the region, including new loans that
might lead to more European gunships in the Western Hemisphere.1 65 Taft
continued the rough trend of this policy in his "dollar diplomacy," which
repaid European loans with American money and established customs
receiverships to guarantee this debt.' 66 Wilson, despite his initial wish to stay
out of Central America, also followed the policies of his predecessors through
World War I. 16 7 Such background geostrategic concerns may have made any
theoretical or legal framework that undermined British interests appear more
plausible and rational.
The general context of increasing American political concern with the
Caribbean was magnified by the development of the Panama Canal. The
United States had entertained the possibility of building a trans-isthmian canal
well before the turn of the century, but initially devoted more energy to
preventing other powers from building and controlling any such canal. 6 8 As
the turn of the century approached, however, the United States began
considering more seriously the possibility and strategic implications of a
trans-isthmian shipping route. Although Taft had preferred canal neutrality
earlier in his diplomatic career, 169 as Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of War,
Taft took charge of the canal project, which was completed in August 1914. In
this role, he paid great attention to ensuring the financial stability and political
162. KRYZANEK, supra note 161, at 29.
163. The Central Americans had actually made efforts to involve the United States as a
bulwark against foreign intervention earlier, particularly as Britain had laid claim to the Caribbean coast
as far south as the San Juan River (on the border of Costa Rica and Nicaragua) by the mid-1840s.
Leonard, supra note 20, at 5. Notwithstanding the efforts of Central American elites to become
economically closer to the United States, Central America remained dependent upon British and German
merchants and markets as of 1900. id. at 7.
164. KRYZANEK, supra note 161, at 48.
165. Id. at 7
166. For an excellent overview of "dollar diplomacy" in the early twentieth century, see
MUNRO, supra note 17.
167. Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson ultimately shared similar underlying motivations in their
approach to foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. See, e.g., KRYZANEK, supra note 161, at
51.
168. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, negotiated in response to the British taking control of
the mouth of the San Juan River, provided that neither the United States nor Britain would attempt to
control any part of Central America or any possible canal. See MUNRO, supra note 17, at 4.
169. RALPH ELDIN MINGER, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE
APPRENTICESHIP YEARS, 1900-1908, at 104 (1975) (citing a 1901 letter to W.H. Taft's younger brother,
Horace).
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compliance of the Panamanian government and was not loathe to step on
political toes in pursuit of this goal. 170 Taft believed that stability in the
Central American republics was even more desirable than peace in South
America, due to the republics' proximity to the Panama Canal.
As part of the general policy of limiting European involvement in the
region, the United States had been particularly wary of allowing the
development of British oil concessions in Costa Rica, the latter venture being
"of unusual interest because of its relation to naval bases and the proximity of
Costa Rica to the Panama Canal.' 7 2 The State Department aimed to prevent
German and British companies from obtaining oil concessions under
GonzAlez, Tinoco's predecessor, while the American Sinclair Oil Company
was able to obtain a Costa Rican concession in 1916.173 As noted above, Great
Britain's effort to gain a foothold in Costa Rican oil through the 1918 Amory
concession constituted part of its claim in the Tinoco arbitration. Indeed, the
State Department had attempted to prevent the Amory concession and
continued to cautiously encourage Costa Rica's efforts against Great Britain.
Although by Taft's 1923 arbitral award there had been sufficient exploration
to determine that Costa Rica in fact had very little oil wealth, 74 these broader
geostrategic concerns may have made the Tinoco decision's theoretical
framework more appealing.
In understanding the backdrop of Taft's finding on sovereign
government recognition, it is important to keep in mind that the rise of the
Tinoco regime and Wilson's nonrecognition policy took place during World
War I. The Tinoco decision's legal response to Wilson's political
nonrecognition policy not only had ramifications for a stable investment
environment, but also for realpolitik concerns in the Caribbean. Wilson's
policy-to protect the Canal and American interests by promoting stability
and breaking the cycle of revolution in Central America-was at least partly
in the same spirit as dollar diplomacy. 175 However, the policy was unpopular
even within Wilson's cabinet in light of a possible German threat to the
vulnerable Caribbean region. 176 Taft did not appear to share Wilson's
170. Id. at 102-17 (discussing Taft's work on the Panama Canal); see also BURTON, supra note
102, at 37-40.
171. PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 697.
172. Telegram from J.B. Moore, on behalf of U.S. Sec'y of State, to E.J. Hale, Minister in
Costa Rica (Dec. 2, 1913), in [1919] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 866, quoted in MUNRO, supra note 17, at 431.
173. Munro provides an excellent narrative of American interests in Costa Rica, paying special
attention to oil concerns. MUNRO, supra note 17, at 426-48.
174. The United States had initially supported the Sinclair Oil Company in their defense of an
oil concession granted by GonzAlez and definitively approved by Tinoco, which had also been
repudiated by Law No. 41. The determination by 1923 that there was in fact little oil in the Caribbean
basin would have lessened Taft's concerns on this front. See MUNRO, supra note 17, at 448. In any case,
by 1923 there would have been little love for Sinclair in the American government, as the Oil Company
was also implicated in the Teapot Dome Scandal of 1923. See PRINGLE, supra note 104, at 1020.
175. The problem of revolutions was far less of an issue in Costa Rica, which has been
surprisingly stable relative to its neighbors. See PEREZ-BRIGNOLI, supra note 27, at 113, 115.
Nonetheless, Wilson felt that he could not make exceptions to his general rule and hoped to use Tinoco
as an example for other Central American republics.
176. In fact, Wilson may have been the only member of his foreign policy team to
wholeheartedly support the non-recognition policy His Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, urged the
recognition of the Tinoco government in light of concerns about German interests in the Caribbean
basin. MUNRO, supra note 17, at 433-34. There is some intimation among historians that Gonzfilez may
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particular commitment to self-determining (rather than merely stable and
basically law-abiding) foreign governments. Certainly he did not have a deep
respect for the inherent rights of Central Americans to sovereign control over
their own affairs. Panama enjoyed only titular sovereignty during Taft's
administration of the canal project, and he had little respect for the Central
Americans' ability to deal with their own affairs. 177 Although Taft
acknowledged recognition to be a matter of national government policy, his
legal finding that the Tinoco regime constituted Costa Rica's sovereign
government may also have been bolstered by realpolitik considerations
against the backdrop of World War I. In short, the overall context of economic
and geostrategic competition in the Caribbean may have colored Taft's
formulation of the Tinoco decision.
The insight that competition-when it works well--can benefit
consumers by lowering the price of goods and monetary credit is not new. But
in the context of the sovereign debt regime, competition may have benefits
that extend beyond loan pricing. In particular, it may undermine the
development of a conceptual monopoly in sovereign lending. Although a
noncompetitive market would tend toward a strictly statist account, with its
occasional windfalls to creditors, a competitive market should allow for
greater flexibility. Against a competitive backdrop, flexible conceptions of
sovereignty in the sovereign debt market may appear more economically
rational than a purely statist framework. This suggestion provides an
additional lens for interpreting the Tinoco decision in light of early twentieth-
century British-American competition in the Caribbean. The creditor seeking
to ensure a return on a previous loan-Great Britain in this case-reasonably
championed a strict statist approach to sovereignty. However, American
interests in the region as both a potential creditor and a geostrategic player
may have modcrated the univocality of the preferred British framework. This
is not to suggest a direct causal link between this competitive background and
Taft's finding for Costa Rica in the Tinoco Case. Rather, the larger context of
creditor competition granted more conceptual space for Taft's own
consideration of legal possibility and market rationality, and for his ultimate
adoption of an intermediate rule-of-law conception of sovereignty in his
arbitral decision. This competition may also explain the muted reaction of the
American press and Costa Rica's own ability to float new loans soon after the
finding.
Although a larger causal claim cannot be made through a single case
study, this explanatory framework suggests that the absence of a more flexible
intermediate approach to sovereignty for most of the twentieth century may be
related to decreasing competitiveness in international finance.' While the
in fact have been sympathetic to the Germans. However, the seriousness of the German threat is unclear.
Leonard notes that a New York Times correspondent close to Tinoco planted stories of German plots
against Costa Rica in an effort to encourage recognition. Leonard, supra note 20, at 12.
177. He told his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, that he yearned for the "right to knock
their heads together until they should maintain peace between them." Letter from W.H. Taft to Philander
Knox, U.S. Sec'y of State (Dec. 22, 1909), quoted in BURTON, supra note 102, at 66.
178. The empirical findings of this Article constitute part of a larger project on the framework
of sovereignty in sovereign debt over the course of the twentieth century. See Odette Lienau, Who is the
"Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?: A Genealogy of Debt and Reputation in the Twentieth Century
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rise of American banking and geostrategic interests engendered competition in
the early twentieth century, this competitive framework arguably disappeared
as the century progressed. 179 Cross-border lending effectively halted during
the Great Depression, and when sovereign lending reemerged after World
War II, it took on a very different cast. Public lenders such as the U.S.
government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the precursor to the World Bank) took the lead and would not have been
subject to the competitive logic outlined above. 180 When significant private
financing returned to sovereign lending after the oil crises of the 1970s, the
rise of bank syndicates, credit rating agencies, and other information-sharing
and coordinating mechanisms meant that even these private creditors were
more consolidated in their perceptions of risk. 181 In short, the conceptual
space for considerations of alternative approaches to sovereignty in the
sovereign debt regime may have narrowed, making the conceptual monopoly
of a strict statist approach more likely.'
82
V. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War, the sovereign debt crises of the late 1990s, and
the 2003 invasion of Iraq have combined to re-open discussion on the
appropriate framework for sovereign debt in the twenty-first century. In
particular, these upheavals draw attention to the question of whom we mean
by "sovereign" in sovereign lending. Although strictly statist conceptions of
sovereignty became dominant over the twentieth century, the current attention
paid to human rights and popular sovereignty has put pressure on this
conceptual framework. The activism of debt cancellation advocates in both
developing and developed states has brought the related issue of arguably
"odious" debt to greater public attention. Reconsidering U.S. Chief Justice
Taft's key Tinoco arbitration in light of these discussions offers a constructive
framework for thinking about sovereign debt today.
The Tinoco arbitration, as a central precedent for both the "effective
control" doctrine of sovereign recognition and the idea of odious debt, already
holds a unique position in the debate. This Article has reinterpreted the case as
(forthcoming 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). A more
comprehensive assessment of the hypothesis on creditor consolidation is feasible only in this larger
format.
179. Although he does not present it in terms of competition and consolidation, Randall
Germain discusses some of these basic changes in the structure of the international credit market.
RANDALL D. GERMAIN, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CREDIT (1997).
180. Anna Gelpem discusses the different incentives and interests associated with public
creditors, though not in the particular framework of competition. She focuses on how their extensions of
credit may not result in "debt" in the traditional sense. Gelpem, supra note 5. For a longer discussion of
the rise of public creditors in the mid-twentieth century, see Odette Lienau, Closure in the Mid-20th
Century: The Rise of Public Creditors and a Resurgence of Formalism (2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
181. This is not to suggest that these coordination and informational mechanisms were the
result of oligopolistic collusion on the part of financial actors. Rather, the exogenous (and by no means
predetermined) development of these market mechanisms in the mid- to late twentieth century may have
resulted in an oligopolistic effect.
182. Broader geopolitical issues, particularly the Cold War, may also have played an important
role in this consolidation.
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presenting an intermediate or "rule of law" conception of sovereignty that
offers a third way between a strict understanding of sovereignty as either
popular consent or statist control. In particular, it argued that Taft identifies
sovereign statehood through its internal rule of law, rather than through
control by force or democratic institutions. While this intermediate approach
does not mandate any substantive content for internal legal rule, it does insist
that sovereign state debt is binding on successor governments only if the
contracting regime has followed its own legal requirements for competence
and ratification. Taft's Tinoco decision also adds a separate and additional
requirement that sovereign state debt must at least intend to serve a legitimate
government purpose. If creditors fail to make a good faith effort on these two
fronts, the debt contract's validity may be challenged on either element. This
formulation resonates with Taft's own domestic jurisprudence and reconciles
the two competing presentations of Tinoco as supportive of both sovereign
debt continuity and the repudiation of odious government debt.
The circumstances surrounding the Tinoco Case also offer insight into
the contingency of the concepts of sovereignty, market rationality, and
creditor interest that underlie the sovereign debt regime. Taft's decision-
which might be characterized as overly risky by some contemporary
analysts 183--can best be understood as promoting a stable environment for
cross-border investment. The disappearance of Taft's and other odious debt-
type frameworks for much of the twentieth century raises questions about
variation in the concept of sovereignty underlying the sovereign lending
regime. This Article tentatively suggested that the openness or narrowness of
sovereignty in sovereign debt may relate to the degree of competition among
creditors involved in sovereign lending. Early twentieth-century economic and
geostrategic competition between the United States and European powers may
have enablcd the emergence of a more open conception of sovereignty in the
Tinoco decision, hinting that the less competitive creditor structure after
World War II undermined the traction of Taft's and similar approaches until
relatively recently.
The questions and analyses presented here are insufficient to ground a
strong policy proposal. However, they can contribute to the debate on how
best to approach the most contentious issues in sovereign lending. Developing
country debt advocates have called for far-ranging assessments of the validity
of sovereign debt burdens, and U.S. courts have heard cases on arguably
odious and unbeneficial sovereign debts. 184 A rule-of-law approach should be
among those considered for how to identify enforceable sovereign debt. In re-
presenting Taft's framework, this Article joins recent legal scholarship that
encourages the development of an international debt regime balancing
financial workability with greater attention to states' underlying populations.
183. See, e.g., Iraq's Debt, supra note 2; Rajan, supra note 7.
184. See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 134; Africa: Debt Arbitration, AFRICA ACTION, Mar. 8, 2002,
http://www.africaaction.org/docs02/debtO2O3.htm. See also, for example, the series of cases related to
the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant Unit in Bagac, Bataan in the Philippines, built by Westinghouse
Electric. Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec., 43 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 1994); Philippines v. Westinghouse
Elec., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989); Westinghouse Int'l v. Nat'l Power Corp. (U.S. v. Phil.), 7 Int'l
Arb. B-I (1992) (litigation related to a debt contract frequently listed by debt cancellation advocates as
"odious"); see also RP Pays Off Nuclear Power Plant After 30 Years, supra note 138.
Who is the "Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?
As a final question, it might be asked whether Taft's intermediate
framework is only a stepping stone to a stronger liberal democratic conception
of popular sovereignty. Does the Tinoco arbitration offer only a weak second-
best to the more complete approach offered in some modem human rights
work? 8 5 Certainly, it may seem that ever-greater attention to the population as
the core of legitimacy would be preferable. However, there are good reasons
to maintain some link to more traditionalist accounts of sovereignty in the
international arena. The strong version of a project of popular sovereignty
risks an updated, more legalized, and perhaps more coercive re-inscription of
the civilized/uncivilized paradigm that existed prior to the twentieth
century. 186 Given the complex relationship between international law and
local state autonomy that exists at the turn of the twenty-first century, a more
cautious rule-of-law conception of sovereignty may offer a useful third way
that extends even beyond the arena of sovereign debt.
185. Michael Reisman suggests as much, though he focuses on the "effective control" element
of the decision. Reisman, supra note 37, at 870.
186. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION, AND
WORLD POLiTics 66, 86-91 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999). As Kingsbury points out, "[a]
decline in the traditional sovereignty system weakens the relationship of mutual containment between
sovereignty and inequality." Id. at 92.
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